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Subsidizing Technology Competition: China’s Evolving 
Practices and International Trade Regulation 
Weihuan Zhou† & Mandy Meng Fang†† 
Abstract: This article contributes to the growing debate about industrial 
policies and subsidies, the adequacy of the rules of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and future international negotiations of industrial 
subsidies, using China’s practices in the high-tech sector as an illustration. 
Through a review of China’s industrial policies in the high-tech sector including 
the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), we show China’s entrenched 
commitments and ambitions towards indigenous innovation, technology 
independence, and global leadership in key and emerging technologies 
especially in strategic sectors. However, we challenge the mainstream view that 
the existing WTO rules are inadequate to deal with Chinese subsidies. Based 
on a detailed analysis of the general subsidy rules and the relevant China-
specific rules, we argue that the current rules create no hurdle to tackling the 
major types of technology subsidies in China. Any perceived deficiencies are 
not China-specific and can only be addressed by WTO Members via 
negotiations. If such negotiations are desirable, then governments should seek 
to leverage the impacts of the pandemic and the global (ab)use of subsidies to 
generate the political will needed. Drawing on existing proposals for the reform 
of WTO subsidy rules, we develop some general principles and approaches to 
facilitate future negotiations emphasizing the need to focus on targeting trade-
distortive subsidies rather than China, to balance between strengthening subsidy 
rules and preserving policy space, to follow economic guidance and data while 
accommodating political considerations, and most innovatively, to shift from 
the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to a country-specific approach through a 
scheduling method whereby an Industrial Subsidy Schedule is created to record 
policy objectives, subsidy commitments, and exceptions of each nation. 
Cite as: Weihuan Zhou & Mandy Meng Fang, Subsidizing Technology 
Competition: China’s Evolving Practices and International Trade Regulation, 
30 WASH. INT’L L.J. 470 (2021). 
INTRODUCTION 
Technological competition is one of the most defining 
elements in United States-China trade tensions. China is 
unwaveringly committed to a new growth model based on 
promoting technological capability and indigenous innovation, 
especially in strategic sectors. However, the United States has 
considerable concerns about China’s approaches to technological 
advancement and the growing challenges that China’s 
achievements and ambitions pose to United States’ interests and 
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values.1 As a result, the Trump Administration responded with a 
series of measures including Section 301 tariffs on a massive list 
of Chinese products,2 the ban on the supply of US technology, 
hardware, and software to China’s tech giant Huawei,3 the ‘China 
Initiative’ to enforce laws against technology theft in all US states, 
export controls over ‘foundational’ and ‘emerging’ technologies, 
and restrictions on the funding of joint research and development 
(R&D) activities with China.4 However, China’s reactions have 
been firmly defensive and proactive making continuous efforts to 
strengthen, refine, and upgrade policy priorities and strategies in 
support of technology-based economic development and digital 
transformation. 
The race for global technological supremacy by the 
world’s two largest trading nations has profound and far-reaching 
implications for international trade regulation. The two-year-long 
bilateral trade war, with technological competition being one of 
the underlying drivers,5 has amply demonstrated the United States’ 
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Herbert Smith Freehills China International Business and Economic Law (CIBEL) Centre, 
Faculty of Law and Justice, UNSW Sydney. Email: weihuan.zhou@unsw.edu.au. 
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 We benefited from valuable and insightful comments by our discussions with, 
in alphabetical order, Steve Charnovitz, Peter Draper, Henry Gao, Wenwei Guan, Gary 
Horlick, Simon Lester, Petros Mavroidis, Bryan Mercurio, Luca Rubini, Robert Staiger, 
and Markus Wagner. We are responsible for any errors and omissions. 
1  See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO 
CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 
1974 (2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF. For a 
recent report on China’s technological achievements in a variety of strategic sectors, see 
TARUN CHHABRA ET AL., GLOBAL CHINA: TECHNOLOGY, (2020), www.brookings.edu/re
search/global-china-technology/. 
2  See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., China Section 301-Tariff Actions and 
Exclusion Process, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-
investigations/tariff-actions. 
3  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., Commerce Department Further 
Restricts Huawei Access to US Technology and Adds Another 38 Affiliates to the Entity 
List (Aug. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/BEJ3-S27H. 
4  See BRENDAN THOMAS-NOONE, TECH WARS: US-CHINA TECHNOLOGY 
COMPETITION AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR AUSTRALIA 6–15 (2020), 
www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/us-china-technology-competition-and-what-it-means-for-
australia. 
5  See generally MARIANNE SCHNEIDER-PETSINGER ET AL., US–CHINA 
STRATEGIC COMPETITION: THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP, 
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shift in trade policy to unilateralism when tackling China-related 
problems and the catastrophic damage that shift has inflicted on 
multilateralism.6 The United States-China Phase One trade deal 
does not address the systemic issues—particularly China’s 
industrial policies, subsidies and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs)—that are at the core of China’s technological 
development practices.7 As of this writing, it remains to be seen 
whether the Biden Administration will take a more moderate and 
constructive approach towards China and multilateral cooperation 
under the World Trade Organization (WTO).8  
The COVID-19 outbreak has imposed unprecedented 
pressure on governments to leverage their policy tools to 
ameliorate the pandemic’s effects on their citizens. In the pursuit 
of economic nationalism, governments have resorted to a wide 
spectrum of trade, monetary and fiscal measures—such as export 
restrictions, stimulus packages and subsidies—while paying little 




6  See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, United States Unilateralism and the World 
Trade Organization, 37 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2019). 
7  See Economic And Trade Agreement Between The Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, China-U.S., 
Jan. 15, 2020, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongoliataiwan/peoples-
republicchina/phase-one-trade-agreement/text; see also Weihuan Zhou & Henry Gao, US-
China Phase One Deal: A Brief Account, WOLTERS KLUWER: REGULATING FOR 
GLOBALIZATION BLOG, (Jan. 22, 2020), http://regulatingforglobalization.com/2020/01/22
/us-china-phase-one-deal-a-brief-account/(summarizing the Phase One Deal by showing 
the significance of SOEs as instrument for implementing industrial policies in China for 
both recipients and providers of subsidies); see generally ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV. 
[OECD], STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AS GLOBAL COMPETITORS: A CHALLENGE OR AN 
OPPORTUNITY? (2016), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/state-
owned-enterprises-as-global-competitors_9789264262096-en#page1 (explaining the 
challenges that SOEs pose to international economic order).  
8  See, e.g., Eric Emerson et al., Client Advisory: The US Trade Agenda in the 
Biden Administration, STEPTOE GLOB. TRADE POL’Y BLOG (Nov. 10, 2020), 
www.steptoeglobaltradeblog.com/2020/11/client-advisory-the-us-trade-agenda-in-the-
biden-administration/#more-2010; see Eamon Barrett, Why A Biden Presidency Won’t End 
the U.S.-China Trade War, FORTUNE (Nov. 9, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/11/09/joe-
biden-us-china-trade-war/;see also POL’Y PLANNING STAFF, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE CHINA CHALLENGE (Nov. 2020), www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/11/20-02832-Elements-of-China-Challenge-508.pdf (discussing 
challenges posed by China and possible U.S. responses in the future by U.S. State 
Department). 
9  See WTO, COVID-19 and World Trade, 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e.htm. 
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For China, technology becomes even more crucial for economic 
recovery and continuous growth, which requires deploying more 
resources to promote R&D and build new enabling infrastructure 
in strategic sectors. These initiatives will strengthen China’s 
commitment to technological advancement and propel its pursuit 
towards global leadership in technology and innovation, thereby 
further intensifying strategic competition between the United 
States and China.10 
Many experts and observers have rightly called upon 
governments to combat the pandemic through collective action.11 
However, the pandemic is not the root cause of the US-China 
economic relations crisis or international trade problems generally. 
Many fundamental problems predate COVID-19 and will persist 
after it.12 When it comes to technological rivalry, one of United 
States’ top concerns has been China’s State-led development 
model and the provision of significant and extensive subsidies 
along with other forms of support to create national champions in 
the high-tech sector. 13  Although subsidies are used widely by 
governments for various policy goals and constitute an essential 
policy tool to stimulate economic recovery during the pandemic,14 
there seems to be a shared concern, as highlighted in a series of 
US-EU-Japan joint statements about China’s industrial policies 
and subsidies due to their size, complexity, and growing global 
 
10  See generally ALEX CAPRI, HINRICH FOUNDATION, STRATEGIC US-CHINA 
DECOUPLING IN THE TECH SECTOR (2020). 
11  See, e.g., CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y RESEARCH., COVID-19 AND TRADE POLICY: 
WHY TURNING INWARD WON’T WORK (Richard E. Baldwin & Simon J. Evenett eds., 
2020); see, e.g., Barry Eichengreen & Douglas A. Irwin, The Slide to Protectionism in the 
Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?, 70 J. OF ECON. HIST. 871, 894 (2010). 
12  See generally Weihuan Zhou et al., Introduction: Rethinking, Repacking and 
Rescuing World Trade Law, in RETHINKING, REPACKAGING, AND RESCUING WORLD 
TRADE LAW IN THE POST-PANDEMIC ERA (Amrita Bahri et al. eds., forthcoming 2021) 
Ch. 1. 
13  See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2019 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 30–32 (2020), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Report_on_China%E2%80%99s_WTO_Complia
nce.pdf. 
14  See Simon J. Evenett, International Trade Governance: 30 Years after the 
Marrakesh Agreement, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, June 10, 2020, 
www.cigionline.org/articles/international-trade-governance-30-years-after-marrakesh-
agreement. 
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impact.15 Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that such policies 
and subsidies will remain central to the heightening US-China 
technology competition and international trade rulemaking.16  
This article makes several contributions to the ongoing 
debate about China’s industrial policies and subsidies, the 
adequacy of existing WTO rules, and future international 
negotiations of industrial subsidies. Although we use China’s 
high-tech sector as an illustration, our discussions and 
observations may be applied to other Chinese industries and 
subsidies. Likewise, our proposals for future negotiations of 
subsidy rules are generally applicable at multilateral and sub-
multilateral levels.  
Section I provides an overview of the evolution of China’s 
industrial policies in pursuit of technological advancement and 
innovation with a focus on the current policies and latest major 
developments. It shows China’s entrenched commitments and 
growing ambitions towards “indigenous innovation,” technology 
independence, and global leadership in key and emerging 
technologies, especially in strategic sectors. This section sets the 
necessary background for a more detailed analysis of China’s 
major subsidies in the high-tech sector and the adequacy of 
existing WTO rules to address them.  
Section II expounds the typical types of China’s 
technology subsidies and the key legal criteria for determining 
whether such subsidies may be captured under the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).17 
Contrary to the dominant view that ASCM rules have significant 
 
15  See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., Joint Statement of the 
Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the U.S., Japan, and the EU (May 23, 2019), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/may/joint-
statement-trilateral-meeting; see also, e.g., Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., Joint 
Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the U.S., and the EU 
(Jan. 14, 2020), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2020/january/joint-statement-trilateral-meeting-trade-ministers-japan-united-
states-and-european-union [hereinafter 2020 Joint Statement]. 
16  See ALAN DUPONT, NEW COLD WAR: DE-RISKING US-CHINA CONFLICT 
(2020), www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/white-paper/us-china-trade/new-cold-war/. 
17  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter ASCM]. This agreement elaborates the rules set out in Articles 
VI and XVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A‐11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
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deficiencies in addressing Chinese subsidies, we argue that these 
rules do not create any substantive obstacle to tackling the major 
types of subsidies being applied in China’s high-tech sector. 
Further, in the few circumstances where difficulties may arise, 
they occur in relation to all WTO Members and are not China-
specific. Arguably, China’s WTO-plus obligations have provided 
not only additional tools to address the difficulties in tackling 
Chinese subsidies, but also rules that are broad enough to 
constrain Chinese government intervention in the economy 
generally. Therefore, WTO Members should be encouraged to 
increasingly leverage the existing rules when dealing with 
Chinese subsidies. Meanwhile, WTO Members should note that 
the ASCM is not the sole source of discipline to address State-led 
market distortions in China.  
Section III engages in the discussion of reforms by 
reviewing the major proposals in scholarship and developing 
some general principles and approaches for future negotiations of 
industrial subsidies. If reforms to the existing subsidy rules are 
desirable, they can only be undertaken by WTO Members via 
negotiations.18 The widespread use of industrial subsidies during 
the pandemic created a golden opportunity for governments to 
rethink the issues of subsidies and generate the political will 
needed for international cooperation to further develop the 
subsidy rules. We argue that the negotiations need to (1) focus on 
addressing trade-distortive subsidies in all economies involved as 
opposed to being disproportionately focused on China and (2) 
achieve a balance whereby future subsidy regulations would not 
unduly constrain governments’ capacities to use subsidies for 
legitimate regulatory goals. Most importantly, we call for the 
creation of country-specific commitments and exceptions via a 
scheduling approach, like what has been applied in relation to 
tariff concessions and commitments on trade in services. That is, 
each WTO Member should have an Industrial Subsidy Schedule 
that: (1) records the sectors in which subsidies exist, or may need 
to be granted, (2) the policy objective(s) and magnitude of the 
subsidies, (3) any upper limit and phase-down or phase-out 
periods of existing subsidies, and (4) any foreseeable exceptions. 
 
18  See WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 9 (5th ed. 2015) (“The WTO was born 
out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is the result of negotiations.”). 
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This approach would facilitate negotiations as it responds to 
countries’ different regulatory priorities and economic, political, 
and social situations and constraints in terms of the use of 
subsidies, the level of support, etc. especially in the 
(post-)pandemic era.  
Section IV concludes by reiterating the need to rethink the 
efficacy of existing WTO rules in dealing with Chinese subsidies 
and to develop new and feasible approaches to the industrial 
subsidy negotiations. 
I. CHINA’S HIGH-TECH POLICIES 
This section reviews briefly the evolution of China’s 
industrial policies in the high-tech sector. There is no 
internationally agreed definition of ‘high-tech sector’. 19  Like 
other countries, China developed its own high-tech industries, 
development goals, supportive policy instruments, and guidance 
for policy implementation.  
‘Technology modernization’ formed an integral element 
of China’s national policy for economic reform and development 
as early as 1963,20 which was subsequently incorporated into the 
well-known Economic Reform and Opening-Up policy in 1978.21 
In 1995, China developed the ‘technology modernization’ strategy 
to underscore the vital importance of science and education to 
economic growth (i.e., Ke Jiao Xing Guo), which marked the 
beginning of national policies consistently prioritized scientific 
 
19  See generally Thomas Hatzichronoglou, Revision of the High-Technology 
Sector and Product Classification (OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working 
Paper No. 1997/02, 1997), www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/revision-of-
the-high-technology-sector-and-product-classification_134337307632; Johan Schot & 
Edward Steinmueller, Three Frames for Innovation Policy: R&D, Systems of Innovation 
and Transformative Change, 47 RESEARCH POL. 1554 (2018). 
20  周恩来[Zhou Enlai], 1964年政府工作报告(摘要) [Government Work Report 
1964 (Summary)] (effective 1964) www.gov.cn/premier/2006-02/23/content_208787.htm. 
The policy is known as the ‘Four Modernizations’ set forth by China’s first Premier Zhou 
Enlai. 
21  中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议(公报) [Report of the 
Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] (p
romulgated by the Central Comm., 1978) http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/645
63/65371/4441902.html. 
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and technological advancement. 22  The Ninth Five Year Plan 
(1996––2000) set out seven key technological areas that have been 
refined in subsequent national policies in light of new challenges, 
opportunities and priorities. 23 The Tenth Five Year Plan (2001–
05) expanded the scope of strategic sectors and emphasized 
technologies of critical importance to national economy and 
security and the promotion of their commercial application.24 The 
National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology 
Development Plan for 2006–20, issued by the State Council in 
2005, further refined the strategic sectors and put forward, for the 
first time, “indigenous innovation” as a national strategy that 
aimed to develop China’s own intellectual property rights and 
innovative capability. 25  These policy objectives were 
subsequently reaffirmed in China’s Eleventh Five Year Plan 
(2006-10).26 The Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011–15) launched the 
innovation-based growth model and upgraded the policy priorities 
in the high-tech sector with an emphasis on fostering “indigenous 
innovation” and technological advancement in an updated list of 
priority sectors. 27  That policy upgrade paved the way for the 
 
22  关于加速科学技术进步的决定[The Decision on Accelerating Science and 
Technology Development], (promulgated by the Central Comm. and State Council, May 
6, 1995) www.gov.cn/test/2009-09/29/content_1429943.htm. 
23  关于国民经济和社会发展“九五”计划和 2010年远景目标纲要 [Ninth Five-
Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China and 
the Outlines of Objectives in Perspective of the Year 2010 (1996–2000)] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. People’s Cong. Mar. 17, 1996, effective Mar. 17, 1996) 
www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2001-01/02/content_5003506.htm. The seven areas 
included: information technology; biotechnology; new materials; new energy; aviation and 
aerospace; and marine technology. 
24  关于国民经济和社会发展第十个五年计划纲要 [Tenth Five-Year Plan for 
Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2001–2005)], 
(promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 5, 2001, effective Mar. 5, 2001) 
www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_60699.htm. 
25  国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要（ 2006-2020） [The National 
Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan for 2006–2020] 
(promulgated by the State Council, Feb. 9, 2006) www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/
gjkjgh/200811/t20081129_65774.htm. 
26  中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划纲要 (2006–2010) 
[Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic 
of China (2011–2015)] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 16, 2006, effective Mar. 
16, 2006) www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-03/16/content_228841.htm. 
27  中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要(2011–2015) 
[Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic 
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promulgation of the ‘Made in China 2025’(MIC 2025), an 
ambitious ten-year action plan to develop technological capability 
and indigenous innovation in ten strategic industries: information 
technology; numerical control tools and robotics; aerospace 
equipment; ocean engineering equipment and high-tech ships; 
railway equipment; energy saving and new energy vehicles 
(NEVs); power or renewable energy equipment; new materials; 
medicines and medical devices; and agricultural machinery. 28 
These sectors encompass virtually all high-tech industries that 
have driven economic growth in advanced economies,29 and they 
constitute nearly 40 percent of China’s entire industrial value-
added manufacturing.30 Consistent with the overarching strategy 
of “indigenous innovation,” MIC 2025 is aimed at reducing 
dependence on foreign technologies, and boosting self-sufficiency 
and the internationalization of Chinese home-made technologies 
throughout value chains including foundational technologies (e.g. 
semiconductors), core technologies (e.g. electric vehicle batteries), 
and future technologies (e.g. autonomous driving). 31  The 
Thirteenth Five Year Plan (2016–20) further refined the priority 
sectors to seven strategic industries: energy-saving and 
environmental protection; new-generation information 
 
of China (2011–2015)] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 14, 2011, effective Mar. 
14, 2011) www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm. The priority sectors included: clean 
energy technology; next-generation information technology; biotechnology; high-end 
equipment manufacturing; new energy; new materials; and clean energy vehicles. 
28  国务院关于印发<中国制造 2025>的通知 (2015) [Notice on the Printing and 
Release of ‘Made in China 2025’ (2015)] (promulgated by the State Council on May 8, 
2015, effective May 8, 2015) http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-
05/19/content_9784.htm. 
29  Jost Wubbeke et al., Made in China 2025: the Making of a High-Tech 
Superpower and Consequences for Industrial Countries 6 (Mercator Inst. China Studies, 
Papers on China No. 2, 2016), https://merics.org/en/report/made-china-2025; Max J. 
Zenglein & Anna Holzmann, Evolving Made in China 2025: China’s Industrial Policy in 
the Quest for Global Tech Leadership 10–11 (Mercator Inst. China Studies, Papers on 
China No. 8, 2019), https://merics.org/en/report/evolving-made-china-2025. 
30  U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MADE IN CHINA 2025: GLOBAL AMBITIONS 
BUILT ON LOCAL PROTECTIONS (2017), www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/final_ma
de_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf. 
31  中国制造 2025重点领域技术路线图》[Made in China 2025 Key Technology 
Roadmap] (National Manufacturing Strategy Advisory Committee, Oct. 2015), 
www.cae.cn/cae/html/files/2015-10/29/20151029105822561730637.pdf.  
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technology; biology; high-end equipment manufacturing; new 
energy; new materials; and new-energy automobile.32 
Like many other countries, the Chinese government 
played a critical role developing its high-tech sector.33 The pursuit 
of the policy goals envisaged in the Five Year Plans led to the 
creation of different science and technology programs, 34  and 
supportive measures in various forms like massive investment 
funds, policy loans, loan guarantees, preferential tax, and 
government procurement policies, and export promotion. By the 
end of the Thirteenth Five Year period, China became a global 
leader in many emerging technologies ranging from high-speed 
railways and NEVs, to 5G networks and artificial intelligence.35 
The COVID-19 outbreak strengthened China’s 
commitment to technological advancement and innovation as an 
essential approach to economic recovery and continuous growth. 
For example, a series of initiatives were rolled out, including the 
promotion and commercialization of major technology projects to 
revitalize economic growth, the expansion of financial support for 
high-tech sectors,36 and most notably, the commitment to build 
 
32  中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要(2016–2020) 
[Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s 
Republic of China (2016–2020)] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 17, 2016, 
effective Mar. 17, 2016), www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-03/17/content_5054992.htm. 
33   See generally Michele Di Maio, Industrial Policies in Developing Countries: 
History and Perspectives, in INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF CAPABILITIES ACCUMULATION 108–43 (Mario Cimoli et al. eds., 2009). 
34  Key programs at the early stage of development included, for instance, the so-
called ‘863’, ‘973’, ‘Spark’ and ‘Torch’ programs. See generally Margaret McCuaig-
Johnston & Moxi Zhang, China Embarks on Major Change in Science and Technology (U. 
of Alta., Occasional Paper Series No. 2, 2015). More recent programs included, for 
example, the National Natural Science Fund, the Major Science and Technology Projects, 
the National Key R&D Programs, the Technology Innovation Guidance Fund, and the 
Bases and Talents Program. These programs are aimed at systematically reshaping the 
entire national funding system for science, technology and innovation. See 国务院关于印
发深化中央财政科技计划（专项，基金等）管理改革方案的通知  [Notice on 
Deepening the Reform Plan of Central Fiscal Measures on Technology (Funds)] 
(promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 7, 2015) www.most.gov.cn/tpxw/201501/t20150
106_117285.htm. 
35  See Zenglein & Holzmann, supra note 29, at 9–10. 
36  关于科技创新支撑复工复产和经济平衡运行的若干措施  [Several 
Measures on Supporting the Resumption of Work and Production and the Stability of 
Economy with Technology and Innovation] (promulgated by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, Mar. 21, 2020), www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-
03/22/content_5494142.htm. 
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new infrastructure (hereinafter New Infrastructure Initiative).37 
The New Infrastructure Initiative originated from the Central 
Economic Work Conference in December 2018, which endorsed 
the importance of “promoting the revolution of manufacturing 
skills and the update of essential tech-supportive equipment, 
accelerating and expanding the commercialization of 5G, and 
strengthening artificial intelligence, industrial internet, and 
internet of things.”38 The Initiative will play a significant role in 
China’s ambition to become a superpower in science, technology, 
and innovation.39 
The New Infrastructure Initiative is being implemented 
through a new investment and development model underpinned 
by diversified investment sources, suggesting a departure from 
State-led investment in traditional infrastructure.40  In the short 
term, however, it is likely that central and local governments and 
state entities will remain important players in the Initiative.41 This 
has become evident in implementation actions adopted at both 
national and local levels. For example, some major projects at the 
central level involved China Mobile’s RMB 100 billion 
investment in 5G,42 State Grid’s RMB 181 billion investment in 
ultra-high-voltage power facilities,43 and China Southern Power 
Grid’s RMB 25 billion investment in concentrated charging 
stations in the southern region of China over the coming four 
 
37  Premier Keqiang Li, 2020年政府工作报告, [2020 Government Work Report] 
May 22, 2020, www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2020lhzfgzbg/index.htm. 
38  ‘中央经济工作会议举行习近平李克强作重要讲话’ [President Xi Jinping 
and Premier Li Keqiang Give Speech at the Central Economic Working Conference], 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 12, 2019, www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-
12/12/content_5460670.htm. 
39  See generally REBECCA ARCESATI ET AL., MERCATOR INST. FOR CHINA 
STUDIES, CHINA’S DIGITAL PLATFORM ECONOMY: ASSESSING DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS 
INDUSTRY 4.0 8 (2020). 
40  See 2020 Government Work Report, supra note 37. 
41  Zhang Dingfa & Liu Cheng, State-Owned Enterprises Lead the New 
Infrastructure and Cultivate New Economic Growth Engines, PEOPLE.CN, (Apr. 24, 2020), 
http://ccnews.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0424/c141677-31686310.html. 
42  Zhang Lulu, China Eyes “New Infrastructure” to Shore Up Growth, 
CHINA.ORG.CN (Mar. 22, 2020), www.china.org.cn/business/2020-
03/22/content_75844807.htm. 
43  (央企发力万亿新基建 不走“四万亿”老路) [State-Owned Enterprises Force 
Trillions of New Infrastructure, Not to Follow the “Four Trillion” Old Road], 
CAIJING.COM.CN (Mar. 21, 2020), http://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202003211426920955.
html (China). 
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years. 44  Local governments have also swiftly localized the 
Initiative and developed implementation strategies. Here 
examples include Beijing’s three-year plan focusing on the 
construction in six core sectors and 30 key projects;45 Shanghai’s 
three-year plan to invest RMB 270 billion in four priority 
sectors;46 and Guangdong’s massive construction plan injecting 
RMB 5.9 trillion in 1,230 projects prioritizing high-speed railway, 
ultra-high voltage grid, 5G, and new energy.47 Notably, private 
companies are playing an increasing role. Some of China’s tech 
giants, such as Alibaba and Tencent, pledged investments of 
billions of RMB in cloud infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and 
other technologies.48  
On March 11, 2021, China’s National People’s Congress 
adopted the Fourteenth Five Year Plan (2021–25) and the 2035 
 
44  (两大电网开启充电桩建设新高潮) [Two Major Power Grids Start a New 
Climax in the Construction of Charging Piles], PEOPLE.CN (Apr. 15, 2020), 
http://energy.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0415/c71661-31674815.html (China).  
45  北京市加快新型基础设施建设行动方案（2020-2022 年） [Beijing Action 
Plan for Accelerating the Construction of New Infrastructure (2020-2022)], (promulgated 
by Beijing Bureau of Economy and Information Technology, June 2, 2020) 
www.beijing.gov.cn/fuwu/lqfw/ztzl/xytxms/zxxx/202006/t20200610_1922075.html 
(China). These six core sectors are: (1) new internet infrastructure, (2) data intelligence 
infrastructure, (3) ecosystem infrastructure, (4) technological innovation infrastructure, (5) 
smart application infrastructure, and (6) trusted and secure infrastructure. 
46  (上海市推进新型基础设施建设行动方案 2020-2022 年) [Action Plan for 
Accelerating the Construction of New Infrastructure in Shanghai (2020-2022)] 
(promulgated by Shanghai People’s Mun. Gov’t, Apr. 29, 2020) 
http://stcsm.sh.gov.cn/zwgk/ghjh/20200603/a4c074e101374866a619424aae7a3fbd.html 
(China). The four priority sectors in Shanghai’s plan are: (1) new internet, (2) new 
infrastructure, (3) new platforms, and (4) new terminals. 
47  (广东省发展改革委关于下达广东省 2020 年重点建设项目计划的通知) 
[Notice of the Guangdong Provincial Development and Reform Commission on Issuing 
the Key Construction Project Plan of Guangdong Province in 2020] (promulgated by 
Guangdong Provincial Dev. And Reform Comm., Feb. 28, 2020) http://drc.gd.gov.cn/tjxx
5631/content/mpost_2956713.html (China). 
48  Josh Horwitz, Alibaba to Invest $28 Billion in Cloud Services After 
Coronavirus Boosted Demand, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2020), www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-alibaba-cloud-investment/alibaba-to-invest-28-billion-in-cloud-services-after-
coronavirus-boosted-demand-idUSKBN22208E; Arjun Kharpal, Tencent Pledges $70 
Billion Investment in High-Tech Areas as Beijing Pushes Digital Infrastructure, CNBC 
(May 27, 2020), www.cnbc.com/2020/05/27/china-tech-giant-tencent-pledges-70-billion-
investment-in-ai-cloud.html. 
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Long-Term Goals. 49  As anticipated, this blueprint emphasizes 
technology and innovation as a critical element in the pursuit of 
technological independence and global competitiveness, which in 
turn serves the overarching goals of modernization and economic 
development. 50  While the blueprint maintains the list of the 
strategic industries contemplated in MIC 2025 and the Thirteenth 
Five Year Plan, it also highlights the vital importance of 
foundational research in many frontier areas. Those areas include 
new generations of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 
integrated circuits, neuroscience, gene and biotechnology, clinical 
medicine and health, aerospace, and deep land and deep-sea 
technology. 51  These policies and objectives will lead to more 
government support, including the wide spectrum of subsidies 
mentioned above and discussed in more detail in Section II.  
II. INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS OF SUBSIDIES 
Subsidies are one of the most perplexing and 
controversial areas of international trade regulation.52 The current 
WTO rules on subsidies have undergone nearly eight decades of 
development and remain underdeveloped and problematic 
according to prevailing views of today. 53  The multilateral 
negotiations leading to the subsidy rules’ creation and eventually 
the ASCM’s conclusion in the Uruguay Round, have essentially 
revolved around a few major competing interests, including on the 
one hand, protecting the value of tariff concessions and 
 
49  See (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和 2035年远
景目标纲要 ) [The Fourteen Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social 
Development of the People’s Republic of China and the Outline of the Long-Term Goals 
for 2035], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 13, 2021) http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-
03/13/content_5592681.htm (China). 
50  Id. 
51  Id. § 3.2, ch. 1. 
52  See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 1 (U. Chi. L. Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 
Working Paper No. 186, 2003) https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economic
s/516/. 
53  See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY 
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 293-303 (2d ed. 1997); Alan O. Sykes, The 
Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 473 (2010); Gary N. Horlick & Peggy A. Clarke, WTO Subsidies Discipline 
During and After the Crisis, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 859 (2010); Chad Bown & Jennifer 
Hillman, WTO’ing a Resolution to the China Subsidy Problem, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 557 
(2019).  
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disciplining trade-distortive subsidies, and on the other hand, the 
widespread and persistent need to use subsidies. 54  The 
fundamental challenge has been determining how to strike a 
balance between the regulation of ‘bad’ subsidies and the 
preservation of governments’ rights to use ‘good’ subsidies in 
their pursuit of policy objectives.55  
This challenge reflects both the standard economics on 
trade policies and the political bargain in trade negotiations. Trade 
economists have convincingly shown that subsidies are generally 
more efficient policy instruments to address domestic externalities 
or non-trade policy objectives because they target a problem’s 
source more directly, as compared to tariffs and quotas.56 This is 
known as the Specificity or Targeting Rule derived from the well-
established Theory of Distortions and Welfare. 57  Accordingly, 
economists have cautioned against excessive discipline on 
subsidies that would cause governments to resort to second-best 
instruments and have instead reiterated the need for international 
 
54  See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 367–
69 (1969); 2 PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE 
WTO AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN GOODS 186–91 (2016); Richard R. Rivers & John D. 
Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: 
Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 L. & POL’Y. INT’L BUS. 1447 (1979); Gerard 
Depayre, Negotiating Subsidies in the GATT/WTO: The Tokyo Round and the Uruguay 
Round, in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND 
ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES 51-56 (Luca 
Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016). For a more comprehensive and sophisticated 
review of Uruguay Round negotiations of subsidy rules, see 2 THE GATT URUGUAY 
ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 833–84. (Terrence P. Steward ed., 1993). 
55  See Jan Woznowski, The Shape of Things: Few Thoughts on Negotiating Rules 
on Subsidies in the GATT and WTO, in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? REFLECTIONS ON THE 
HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SUBSIDY 
DISCIPLINES 45, 45–47 (Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016); Hugo Paemen, 
Forces that (May) Have Shaped Subsidy Regulation, in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? 
REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES 49, 49–50 (Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016). 
56  See, e.g., RICHARD BLACKHURST, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT 
TYPES OF TRADE MEASURES AND THEIR IMPACT ON CONSUMERS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND THE CONSUMER 94–111 (1986); see Peter H Lindert, The Basic Analysis of a Tariff, 
in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 121, 121 (8th ed., 1986). 
57  See generally JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, The Generalized Theory of Distortions 
and Welfare, in TRADE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GROWTH: PAPERS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER 69–90 (Jagdish N. 
Bhagwati et al., eds., 1971); see generally JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY 
(2002) (reviewing the historical development of the theory and its applications). 
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rules to distinguish between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ subsidies. 58 
Generally speaking, ‘bad’ subsidies would inflict welfare losses 
on trading partners and the world economy as a whole, whereas 
‘good’ subsidies genuinely serve non-protectionist, trade-
unrelated regulatory goals, regardless of their side-effects on 
trade.59 
Although trade negotiators are usually knowledgeable 
about the above economic principles, they are constrained by 
internal politics and tend to succumb to the pressures of influential 
constituents.60 Consequently, the WTO subsidy rules are not so 
much concerned about the welfare effects of subsidies as about 
the impact on competing producer interests. 61  The political 
compromise embodied in the ASCM largely came out of the 
insistence of the United States on stricter subsidy rules on the one 
hand, and the resistance of the EU and others (mainly developing 
countries) to over-regulation and encroachment on policy space 
on the other hand.62 The ASCM reached a middle ground by, inter 
alia, limiting the scope of subsidies and addressing the 
extraterritorial effects of the covered subsidies.63 Only two types 
– export subsidies and local content subsidies – are prohibited.64 
Domestic subsidies are generally ‘actionable’ only (as opposed to 
‘prohibited’), meaning that Members may take actions to address 
the adverse effects of these subsidies. 65  The other important 
element of this compromise was a category of ‘non-actionable’ 
subsidies—including certain subsidies for R&D, environmental 
 
58  See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 53; Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Will 
International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?, 96 AMER. ECON. 
REV. 877 (2006); LUCA RUBINI, E15 INITIATIVE, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL SUBSIDIES 
DISCIPLINES: RATIONALE AND POSSIBLE AVENUES FOR REFORM (2015); KEITH MASKUS, 
E15 INTIATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES: A NEED FOR WTO DISCIPLINES? 
(2015).  
59  However, whether a subsidy produces net welfare gains is often ambiguous and 
difficult to assess as governments tend to subsidize for political reasons without regard to 
the welfare effects of the subsidy. JACKSON, supra note 53, at 281–82. 
60  This observation essentially stems from Public Choice theory. See generally 
Weihuan Zhou, In Defence of the WTO: Why Do We Need a Multilateral Trading System? 
47 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 1, 9 (2020). 
61  See, e.g., MAVROIDIS, supra note 54, at 193–94; Sykes, supra note 53, at 501–
19. 
62  See Stewart, supra note 54, at 833–84. 
63  See ASCM, supra note 17, arts. 1–6. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. 
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protection, and regional development—which were permitted and 
exempted from countervailing actions on a provisional basis for 
five years.66 However, this category expired as WTO Members 
failed to reach a consensus to renew it by December 31, 1999.67 
R&D subsidies warrant more observation given their 
relevance to this article. The Uruguay Round negotiations started 
with a disagreement between proponents of making R&D 
subsidies non-actionable (e.g., the EU, Canada, Switzerland, 
Japan and Nordic Countries) and the United States, which 
opposed the idea of non-actionability in general and regarded 
R&D subsidies as being particularly susceptible to abuse.68 The 
US changed its position at a later stage of the negotiations due to 
a domestic policy shift to promoting subsidization of R&D 
activities under the Clinton Administration since 1993.69 However, 
this shift did not fundamentally change the overall position of the 
US, which continued to push for stricter discipline on trade-
distortive subsidies including confining the scope and magnitude 
of R&D subsidies and retaining the flexibility to apply 
countervailing measures to those beyond the agreed limits.70 The 
final compromise was the incorporation of a carefully-crafted list 
of conditions on R&D subsidies, the provisional application of 
non-actionability, and other requirements such as notification.71 
The inclusion of R&D subsidies in the non-actionable category 
aligns with economic guidance that subsidies tend to be the 
optimal means to correct market failures in R&D activities by 
bringing such activities to the socially optimal level, which in turn 
generates positive spillovers economy-wide. However, the non-
actionability conditions were designed to meet the needs of 
developed economies, particularly the United States, and did not 
accommodate the interests of developing economies. 72  This 
explains why developing countries opposed the extension of the 
 
66  Id. arts. 8, 31.  
67  WTO, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the 
Special Meeting Held on 20 December 1999, G/SCM/M/22 (Feb. 17, 2000).  
68  See Stewart, supra note 54, at 904–14. 
85  See George Kleinfeld & David Kaye, Red Light, Green Light? The 1994 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Research and Development 
Assistance, and U.S. Policy, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 43, 51–52 (1994). 
70  Id. at 52–54.  
71  See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 8. 
72  See Kleinfeld & Kaye, supra note 69, at 51–52.  
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non-actionable category unless the conditions could be modified 
to provide room for them to pursue developmental goals.73 The 
call for improvement of the applicability of non-actionable 
subsidies, including R&D subsidies, for economic development 
has continued in the Doha Round negotiations.74 The expiry of 
non-actionable subsidies means that there currently is no 
distinction between “good” and “bad” subsidies based on policy 
objectives underlying the grant of a subsidy under the ASCM.75  
As noted earlier, there have been growing concerns about 
the effectiveness of WTO subsidy rules in dealing with Chinese 
subsidies effectuated by ambitious industrial policies. One of the 
latest criticisms come from Bown and Hillman, who identified 
many shortcomings in the ASCM to address Chinese subsidies, 
including the definition of subsidies, the difficulties of satisfying 
the relevant evidentiary burden, and lack of notification and 
retrospective remedies.76 But Bown and Hillman’s analysis has 
two major shortcomings. First, they did not provide a detailed 
discussion of specific types of Chinese subsidies and the potential 
issues in applying the existing rules to these subsidies in light of 
the case law. Second, they did not distinguish between 
deficiencies specific to China and those generally applicable to all 
WTO Members. In discussing the existing rules applicability to 
China’s subsidies in the high-tech sector below, we argue that 
these rules have provided sufficient flexibility to address these 
subsidies. Most of the potential challenges in the application of 
these rules are not China-specific, but applicable to all WTO 
Members. Therefore, linking these challenges exclusively to 
China’s subsidies or characterizing them as “China-specific 
problems” is highly questionable and would not help resolve these 
problems in future negotiations. 
 
73  WTO, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the 
Regular Meeting Held on 1-2 November 1999, WTO Doc. G/SCM/M/24 (Apr. 26, 2000). 
For a more detailed discussion of the various views, see Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, Resurrecting the 
Dead? The Expired Non-Actionable Subsidies and the Lingering Question of ‘Green 
Space’, 8 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 2, 8–9 (2011). 
74  For a review of the proposals for reforming subsidy rules by WTO Members, 
see Siqi Li & Xinquan Tu, Reforming WTO Subsidy Rules: Past Experiences and Prospects, 
54 J. WORLD TRADE 853, 854–867 (2020). 
75  See also WOLFGANG MULLER, WTO AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES: A COMMENTARY 7–8 (2017). 
76  See Bown & Hillman, supra note 53, at 567–72.  
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As noted in Section I, China’s pursuit of technological 
advancement involved wide-ranging supportive policy 
instruments including different forms of subsidies. It is both 
unrealistic and unnecessary to cover all these instruments and 
subsidies in this article. Instead, we will consider typical and 
major examples to facilitate a discussion of the efficacy of the 
existing WTO rules which include not only the general rules 
contemplated in the ASCM but also the China-specific rules 
codified in the Protocol on the Accession of China77 (hereinafter 
Accession Protocol) and the Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China78 (hereinafter Working Party Report). 
A. Definition of Subsidies 
The ASCM does not cover all government actions or 
measures that may have the effect of distorting trade but only a 
closed list of subsidies.79 For a measure to be a covered subsidy, 
it must constitute a “financial contribution” (or “any form of 
income or price support”) that is provided by a government, a 
“public body,” or a “private body entrusted or directed,” to 
exercise relevant government functions, and confers a “benefit” to 
the recipient concerned.80 Bown and Hillman did not take issue 
with all these legal elements but focused on the limited scope of 
covered subsidies and the law on the meaning of “public body.”81 
For completeness, we will consider each of these elements below.  
1. Financial contributions — direct transfer of 
funds. — Article 1.1(a)(1) of the ASCM encompasses three types 
of “financial contributions”: (1) direct transfer of funds; (2) 
foregoing or non-collection of government revenue otherwise due; 
and (3) provision of goods or services (other than general 
infrastructure) or purchase of goods. Although the coverage of 
“financial contributions” was intended to be exhaustive and 
 
77 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WTO Doc. 
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Accession Protocol].  
78  WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China (‘Working Party 
Report’), WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001).  
79  See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 1. 
80  Id. 
81  See Bown & Hillman, supra note 53, at 567–72.  
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arguably to avoid “a purely effect-based concept of subsidies,”82 
it has been interpreted and applied in a flexible and broad manner. 
Indeed, in one of the earlier disputes under the ASCM, the 
Appellate Body observed that “financial contribution” covers “a 
wide range of transactions” “through which something of 
economic value is transferred by a government.”83  This broad 
interpretation can apply to Chinese subsidies in the high-tech 
sector.  
“Direct transfer of funds” covers not only measures such 
as grants, loans, and equity infusion, but also “potential direct 
transfers of funds or liabilities,” such as loan guarantees.84 These 
measures and their variations have been found to constitute a 
“financial contribution” in a range of cases. Identified measures 
include, inter alia, grant payments, 85  non-commercial loans, 86 
debt-for-equity swaps and debt rescheduling by way of 
interest/debt reductions, deferrals, and forgiveness, 87  equity 
infusion,88 transfers of equity interests or shares,89 and any other 
forms leading to “an accrual of financial resources” and other 
 
82  Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted Mar. 23, 2012), 
¶ 613 [hereinafter US — Aircraft (2nd complaint)] (holding that “[s]ubparagraphs (i)-(iv) 
exhaust the types of government conduct deemed to constitute a financial contribution”). 
See also Muller, supra note 75, at 62, 74; MAVROIDIS, supra note 54, at 202–03, 215–16. 
83  Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 2004), ¶ 52 [hereinafter US — Softwood Lumber IV].  
84  See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 1.1(a)(1)(i). 
85  Panel Report, Australia — Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of 
Automotive Leather, WTO Doc. WT/DS126/R (adopted June 16, 1999), ¶¶ 2.1–2.5, 9.43–
9.45.  
86  Id. 
87  Panel Report, Korea — Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, 
WT/DS273/R (adopted Apr. 11, 2005), ¶¶ 7.336–7.339, 7.411–7.413. In the panel’s view, 
while “interest reductions and deferrals are similar to new loans” and “interest/debt 
forgiveness is comparable to a cash grant”, debt-for-equity swaps are “a combination of 
equity infusion and debt forgiveness”. See also US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 
82, ¶ 615. 
88  See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82, ¶¶ 622–24 (involving joint 
venture arrangements whereby funds were provided by U.S. National Aeronautics & Space 
Administration and U.S. Department of Defense in exchange for some kind of return, such 
as scientific and technical information (from Boeing). 
89  Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS316/R (adopted June 1, 2011), 
¶ 7.1291 [hereinafter EC — Aircraft].  
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financial claims that improve the financial position of the 
recipient.90  
The sub-category of “potential direct transfers of funds or 
liabilities” typically involves “a legally binding promise” or “an 
obligation to make a direct transfer of funds which, in and of itself, 
is claimed and capable of conferring a benefit on the recipient that 
is separate and independent from the benefit that might be 
conferred from any future transfer of funds.”91 However, it does 
not cover measures that merely create the possibility of transfer of 
funds when pre-defined conditions have been fulfilled. 92  This 
suggests that this type of government actions must involve an 
undertaking to transfer funds upon the fulfillment of pre-defined 
conditions.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the term “direct” does not 
require a transfer of funds to be made by a government directly 
but merely that a government, through its practice, has been 
involved in such a transfer, according to the Appellate Body in US 
– Carbon Steel (India). 93  There, the Appellate Body rejected 
India’s claim that the provision of a loan through an affiliated 
entity to a public body was not a “direct” transfer of funds merely 
due to the involvement of an intermediary or intervening agency.94 
It also clarified that the funds transferred do not have to be “drawn 
from government resources or result in a charge on the public 
account.”95 
Contrary to widespread concerns about the potential 
difficulties in identifying Chinese subsidies on the basis that they 
may be provided in a sophisticated and opaque manner,96 some of 
 
90  Appellate Body Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random 
Access Memories from Korea, WTO Doc. WT/DS336/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007), 
¶¶ 247, 250–52 [hereinafter Japan — DRAMs (Korea)].  
91  See EC — Aircraft, supra note 89, ¶¶ 7.302, 7.304, 7.733, 7.1495 (emphasis in 
original). 
92  Panel Report, United States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft 
(Second Complaint), WTO Doc. WT/DS353/R (adopted Mar. 23, 2012), ¶¶ 7.164–7.166. 
93  Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Measures on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WTO Doc. WT/DS436/AB/R (adopted 
Dec. 19, 2014), ¶ 4.90 [hereinafter US — Carbon Steel (India)].  
94  Id. ¶¶ 4.93–4.94.  
95  Id. ¶ 4.96.  
96  See Bown & Hillman, supra note 53, at 563–70. Also see supra note 15; Mark 
Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance’, (2016)57(2) HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 261, 269–84. 
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the major subsidies in the technology sector fall squarely within 
the category of direct transfer of funds. For example, to boost the 
growth of the NEVs industry, both central and local governments 
have provided a range of financial support,97 mainly in the form 
of direct payments to NEV manufacturers (including R&D grants 
in the sector)98 and consumers,99 and loans from State banks.100 
Between 2009 and 2017, the total support in the industry was 
estimated to be RMB 390 billion ($58.3 billion).101  While the 
forms and amounts of these subsidies have been reviewed and 
adjusted regularly in response to changing needs, the sector’s 
overall support is likely to grow.102 
 
97  Marika Heller, Chinese Government Support for New Energy Vehicles as a 
Trade Battleground, NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH (Sept. 27, 2017), 
www.nbr.org/publication/chinese-government-support-for-new-energy-vehicles-as-a-
trade-battleground/. 
98  See, e.g.,《关于 2018年度，2016年及以前年度新能源汽车推广应用补助
资金清算审核和 2018 年度，2019 年度补助资金预拨审核情况的公示》 [The 
Publication of the Liquidation Review of New Energy Vehicles Promotion and Application 
Subsidies in 2018, 2016 and Previous Years and the Review of Additional Subsidies 
allocated for 2018 and 2019], issued on Mar. 25, 2020, 
http://www.caam.org.cn/chn/9/cate_97/con_5230443.html;《上海市鼓励购买和使用新
能源汽车实施办法》[The Implementing Measures on Encouraging the Purchase and Use 
of New Energy Vehicles in Shanghai] (issued by the Off. of the Shanghai Gov’t, Jan. 31, 
2018), www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw43336/20200824/0001-43336_55412.html (China).  
99  See, e.g.,《关于开展私人购买新能源汽车补贴试点的通知》[The Notice on 
Launching Pilot Subsidies for Private Purchases of New Energy Vehicles], (issued by the 
Ministry of Finance of China, May 31, 2010), www.mof.gov.cn/gp/xxgkml/jjjss/201006/t
20100602_2499641.html (China). For instance, subsidies for plug-in hybrid vehicles and 
pure electric vehicles can be RMB 50,000 and RMB 60,000 per car.  
100  China’s first Automotive Workshop recently obtained a huge credit line worth 
RMB 1015 billion from 16 banks in China, including state banks. See, China’s First 
Automotive Workshop Collaborates Strategically with 16 Banks to Obtain Credit Line 
Exceeding RMB 1 Trillion, XINHUANET (Oct. 25, 2018), www.xinhuanet.com/auto/2018-
10/25/c_1123610511.htm. Another example is Tesla, which secured approximately RMB 
20 billion loans from Chinese banks for its Shanghai Gigafactory. See Tongxin Qian, Tesla 
Shanghai Obtained Another RMB 4 Billion Loans from Chinese Banks, Totaling RMB 20 
Billion Loans, YICAI (May 9, 2020), www.yicai.com/news/100622862.html. 
101  See Scott Kennedy, China’s Expensive Gamble on New-Energy Vehicles, CTR 
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Nov. 6, 2018), www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-expensive-
gamble-new-energy-vehicles. 
102  《关于完善新能源汽车推广应用财政补贴政策的通知》[Notice on Fiscal 
Policies for the Popularization and the Application of New Energy Vehicles] (issued by 
the Ministry of Finance of China, Apr. 23, 2020), www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-
04/23/content_5505502.htm (China). Notably, the detrimental impacts of US – China trade 
war on China’s NEV industry, together with the outbreak of COVID-19, have propelled 
Chinese central government to extend some of the existing NEV subsidies, which 
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Another longstanding example is the massive industrial 
investment funds that the Chinese government directed competent 
national authorities and local governments to establish for eligible 
enterprises in priority sectors since the 1980s.103 Over time, these 
funds have targeted start-ups or technology-oriented small and 
medium sized entities to promote indigenous innovation,104  as 
well as the creation of national champions.105 By the end of 2013, 
343 such funds with a total value of around RMB 270 billion had 
been created.106 The scale and amount of the funds continued to 
 
otherwise would lapse in the end of 2020 to the end of 2022. See Jianhua Zhao, Why does 
China Extend New Energy Vehicle Subsidies?, PEOPLE.CN (Apr. 26, 2020), 
http://auto.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0426/c1005-31688105.html. 
103  The New Technology Venture Capital Company established in 1986 was 
China’s first venture capital company that provided investments and loans for high-tech 
sector. The major shareholders were: State Scientific and Technological Commission and 
Ministry of Finance. The company operated for 13 years. See, Ministry of Science and 
Technology: To Accelerate the Development of Venture Capital with Chinese 
Characteristics and Build New Engine for Innovation-led Growth, CCTV.COM (Sept. 23, 
2016), http://jingji.cctv.com/2016/09/23/ARTIZR6niGUZ2ajwhbFwoVCH160923.shtml. 
104  See, e.g.,《科技型中小企业创业投资引导基金管理暂行办法》[Interim 
Measures on the Administration of Start-up and Investment Guiding Fund for Technology-
oriented Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises] (issued by the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, July 6, 2007), www.most.gov.cn/ztzl/gjzctx/ptzcjrz
c/200802/t20080225_59300.htm (China);《战略性新兴产业发展专项资金管理暂行办
法》 [Interim Measures on the Administration of Special Funds for the Development of 
Strategic Emerging Industries] (issued by the Ministry of Finance and the Nattional 
Development and Reform Commission, Dec. 31, 2012), www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/20
13/content_2376208.htm (China); 《新兴产业创投计划参股创业投资基金管理暂行办
法》[Interim Measures on the Administration of the Equity Participation of Emerging 
Industries Start-up and Investment Plan in the Start-up and Investment Fund] (issued by 
the Ministry of Finance and the National Development and Reform Commission, Aug. 17, 
2011), www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-09/09/content_1944275.htm (China). The prioritized 
areas included: energy conservation and environmental protection, information, bio and 
new medicine, new energy, new materials, aerospace and aviation, marine, advanced 
manufacturing, new energy vehicles, and high- technology service. In 2015, the State 
Council announced the plan to create RMB 40 billion National Guiding Fund for Start-up 
Investment in Emerging Industries. See Press Release, Jun Ding et al., The Establishment 
of National Guiding Fund for Start-up Investment in Emerging Industries with RMB 40 
Billion which can be Multiplied by 5 Times (Jan. 15, 2015) (www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-
01/15/content_2804446.htm). 
105  See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Measuring distortions in 
international markets: The semiconductor value chain, at 51–52, OECD Trade Policy 
Papers No. 234 (Dec. 12, 2019), www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/measuring-distortions-in-
international-markets_8fe4491d-en [hereinafter OECD Semiconductor Report]. 
106  Bank of China Research Institute provided a detailed review of China’s 
Government Guiding Funds, see BANK OF CHINA RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE 
DEVELOPMENT, PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS OF CHINA’S GOVERNMENT GUIDING FUNDS 
(Sept. 26, 2017).  
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grow explosively since 2014, especially after the launch of MIC 
2025. Major examples include the National Integrated Circuit 
Investment Fund (2014) (IC Fund), 107  the Advanced 
Manufacturing Industry Investment Fund (2016), 108  and more 
recently the National Manufacturing Industry Transformation and 
Upgrading Fund (2019).109 All of these funds were created under 
the leadership of the relevant central authorities, particularly the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT), supported by State banks and 
followed by the creation of similar funds by local governments.110 
The funds were provided to select enterprises in the relevant 
sectors mainly by way of equity injection, loans, and loan 
guarantees.111 The IC Fund, for example, was initially supported 
by a State-directed loan of RMB 30 billion from the China 
Development Bank in addition to equity infusion from the MOF 
 
107  See Press Release, Ministry of Indus. and Info. Technology, The Establishment 
of the National Integrated Circuit Investment Fund (Oct. 14, 2014), www.miit.gov.cn/n11
46290/n1146402/n7039597/c7053700/content.html. 
108  See Press Release, State-owned Assets Supervision and Admin. Comm’n of the 
State Council, The Establishment of the Advanced Manufacturing Industry Investment 
Fund (June 12, 2016), www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2588124/c3822803/content.html. 
109  See Ministry of Finance, China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation and others 
Initiated the Establishment of the National Manufacturing Industry Transformation and 
Upgrading Fund Limited Liability Company with Registered Capital Worth RMB 147.2 
Billion, YICAI (Nov. 18, 2019), www.yicai.com/news/100407324.html. 
110  See《创业投资企业管理暂行办法》  [Interim Measures on the 
Administration of Start-up Investment Enterprises] (issued jointly by ten State ministries 
and departments, Nov. 15, 2005, effective Mar. 1, 2006), www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-
11/15/content_99008.htm (China); See also Min Ren, The Initiation of Beijing Municipal 
Technology Innovation Fund Worth Dozens Billions to Support High-end Hard 
Technologies, BEIJING DAILY (June 25, 2018), www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-
06/25/content_5300997.htm; Guangzhou Municipal Government established RMB 5 
billion government guiding fund on the industrialization of scientific and technological 
achievements in 2020. See 《关于印发广州市科技成果产业化引导基金管理办法的通
知》  [Measures for Administration of the Guiding Fund on the Industrialization of 
Scientific and Technological Achievements] (issued by Guangzhou Sci, and Technology 
Bureau, June 19, 2020), http://kjj.gz.gov.cn/gkmlpt/content/5/5955/post_5955622.html#2
75 (China).  
111  See Interim Measures on the Administration of Start-up Investment Enterprises, 
supra note 110. Article 22 stipulates that national and sub-national governments can 
establish investment funds by means of equity participation and other forms of financing 
guarantees. 《关于印发广州市科技型中小企业贷款担保资金管理办法的通
知》 [Measures for Administration of Loan Guarantee Funds for Small and Medium-sized 
Technology Enterprises] (issued by the Guangzhou Department of Finance, Jan. 21, 2020), 
http://czj.gz.gov.cn/gkmlpt/content/5/5637/post_5637742.html#601 (China). 
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and other government entities.112 Between 2014 and 2018, the first 
tranche of the fund invested over RMB 100 billion in 74 projects 
and 52 IC companies, with nearly 80 percent of the investment 
coming from equity injection,113 and contributed significantly to 
creating a handful of the world’s leading IC firms.114 The fund 
recently completed its second tranche capital raising of over RMB 
200 billion, which will focus on investing in home-grown chips 
for advanced materials and equipment, and emerging technology 
infrastructure like 5G.115 Given the broad scope of “direct transfer 
of funds,” there is little doubt that these funds constitute “financial 
contributions” under Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the ASCM. 
Notably, some of the subsidies in the form of “direct 
transfer of funds” may constitute export subsidies, one of the two 
types of prohibited subsidies.116 China’s use of export credits to 
promote exports of high-tech goods offers a good illustration. In 
practice, such measures have been employed by most major 
economies—through financial support like loans—to assist 
domestic exporters selling goods and services to foreign buyers.117 
In China, export credit policies have become a major form of 
support for high-tech firms and exports since the early 2000s, 
including loan support for the export of high-tech products 
 
112  See Press Release, China Dev. Bank Capital, The Establishment of the National 
Integrated Circuit Investment Fund and Its Management Company (www.cdb-
capital.com/GKJR/dynamic/17081111400611?pidx=1); For the shareholding of the Fund, 
see, Li Na, The Second Tranche of the National Big Fund was Established and Where RMB 
200 Billion will Go, YICAI (Oct. 28, 2019), www.yicai.com/news/100380063.html. 
113  The Analysis of China’s National Integrated Circuit Investment Fund First 
Tranche’s Investment, SINA FINANCE (Mar. 13, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://finance.sina.com.
cn/stock/hyyj/2019-03-13/doc-ihsxncvh2157328.shtml. 
114 See OECD Semiconductor Report, supra note 105, at 51–54. 
115  Focus on the Outline of the Second Tranche of the Big Fund and Possible 
Priority Areas for Investment, YICAI (Mar. 19, 2020, 8:40 PM), www.yicai.com/news/1
00556598.html; Sarah Dai, China completes second round of US$29 billion Big Fund 
aimed at investing in domestic chip industry, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 26, 2019, 
12:46 PM), www.scmp.com/tech/science-research/article/3020172/china-said-complete-
second-round-us29-billion-fund-will. 
116  See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 3. 
117  See Kristen Hopewell, Power transitions and global trade governance: The 
impact of a rising China on the export credit regime, 13 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 1, 4–5 
(2019); James Nedumpara & Pankhuri Sharma, Treatment of Export Credits in WTO 
Dispute Settlement and Domestic CVD Proceedings, 1, 7–9 (Ctr. for WTO Stud., Working 
Paper No. CWS/WP/200/7, Mar. 2013), http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/workingpaper/Export%
20Credit%20CWS%20WP.pdfhttp://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/workingpaper/Export%20Credit
%20CWS%20WP.pdf. 
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contemplated in the Catalogue of High and New Tech Products 
and the Catalogue of Chinese New and High-Tech Export 
Products,118 and preferential loans, buyer credit, or export credit 
insurance, for specific products or projects such as 
telecommunications, 119  and NEVs. 120  Such measures are 
widespread at both central and local levels,121 making China one 
of the world’s largest providers of export credits. 122  These 
measures obviously constitute a “financial contribution” and fall 
within the ambit of items (j) and (k) of ASCM’s illustrative list of 
export subsidies, although the extent to which the ASCM leaves 
 
118  《中国进出口银行出口卖方信贷中短期额度贷款管理办法》 [The 
Administration Measures of the Exim Bank of China on Export Sellers’ Credit and Short 
to Medium Term Line of Loan] (issued by Exim Bank of China, Feb. 4, 2002), 
http://pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=alftwotitle&Gid=cb00095e263c71c1bdfb 
(China). 《中国高新技术产品指导目录》 [The Guiding Catalogue of China’s New and 
High- Tech Products] (issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology, Sept. 27 2009), 
www.most.gov.cn/tztg/200910/t20091009_73551.htm (China); 《中国高新技术产品出
口目录》 [The Catalogue of China’s New and High-Tech Export Products] (issued by the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, Jan. 9, 2006),  
http://most.cn/fggw/zfwj/zfwj2006/200512/t20051220_55439.htm (China).  
119  《大型成套电信设备出口项目协调管理实施细则》 [Detailed Rules on the 
Implementation of Coordination and Management of Large-Scale Complete Set 
Telecommunication Export Items] (issued by the Ministry of Com., June 5, 2006), 
http://file.mofcom.gov.cn/article/gkml/200804/20080499611491.shtml (China); As 
alleged by Fred Hochberg, the ex-Chairman and President of the Export-Import Bank of 
the US, Huawei received USD 30 billion credit line from China Development Bank that 
allowed the company to “reduce its cost of capital and to offer financing to their buyers at 
rates and terms better than their competitors.” See Fred Hochberg, Chairman and President 
of the Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S., Remarks at the Center for American Progress: How the 
US Can Lead the World in Exports: Retooling Our Export Finance Strategy for the 21st 
Century, (June 15, 2011) (transcript available at www.exim.gov/sites/default/files/newsre
leases/CAP_Speech.pdf).  
120 《国务院关于印发节能与新能源汽车产业发展规划（2012-2020）的通知》
[Notice on Plan for Energy Conservation and New Energy Vehicles Industry Development] 
(issued by the State Council, June 28, 2012), www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2012/content
_2182749.htm (China).  
121  For a recent example of local export credit policy, see Shanghai Federation of 
Industry and Commerce Signed Strategic Cooperation with Shanghai Exim Bank and 
Shanghai Sinosure, CHINA BUSINESS TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021), http://www.acfic.org.cn/gd
gsl_362/sh/shfgdt/202104/t20210426_256972.html. 
122  Hopewell, supra note 117, at 7–8; EXP.-IMP. BANK OF THE U.S., REPORT TO 
THE U.S. CONGRESS ON GLOBAL EXPORT CREDIT COMPETITION 38 (2020), 
https://www.exim.gov/sites/default/files/reports/competitiveness_reports/2019/EXIM_20
19_CompetitivenessReport_FINAL.pdf.  
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space for using export credit remains controversial.123 However, 
to the extent that such policy space may cause insufficiencies in 
the current subsidy rules in dealing with trade-distortive export 
credit policies, the insufficiencies apply to all WTO Members.  
2. Financial contributions — foregoing or non-collection 
of government revenue otherwise due — A financial contribution 
may be granted if a government foregoes or does not collect 
“revenue that is otherwise due.”124 To date, the WTO case law has 
predominantly concentrated on tax revenues. A major case on this 
issue is US – FSC which concerned the exemption of a foreign 
sales corporation’s (FSC) export-related foreign-source income 
from US income tax. 125  The Appellate Body observed that a 
determination of “otherwise due” requires a comparison between 
“the revenues due under the contested measure and revenues that 
would be due in some other situation” based on “the rules of 
taxation of each Member”. 126  The Appellate Body upheld the 
panel’s finding that the US government had not collected the 
revenue that it was entitled to collect under its own general rules 
of taxation.127 In the compliance proceedings of this dispute, the 
Appellate Body further clarified that the fact that “a government 
does not raise revenue which it could have raised” is not, in itself, 
 
123  For instance, one major controversy concerns the exemption of export credits 
permitted under “an international undertaking on official export credits” from being treated 
as an export subsidy under item (k). In practice, this exemption points to the OECD 
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. However, it remains debatable as to 
whether WTO Members may still take countervailing actions against such export credits; 
See generally Dominic Coppens, How Much Credit for Export Credit Support under the 
SCM Agreement?, 12 INT’L ECON. L.J. 63, 63 (2009); Nedumpara and Sharma, supra note 
117; A related, ongoing debate has been whether China’s export credits comply with the 
conditions contemplated in the OECD Arrangement. This would require a separate and 
detailed study on the specific Chinese measures, which seems lacking in the existing 
literature and falls outside of the scope of this article; See e.g., EXP.-IMP. BANK OF THE 
U.S., supra note 122, at 40–44 (the report identified major Chinese export credit measures 
during 2019 without assessing their compliance with the OECD Arrangement); Gregory 
Shaffer et al., Can Informal Law Discipline Subsidies?, 18 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 711, 725-
729 (2015) (observing that the OECD Arrangement has served as multilateral discipline of 
export credit policies and may be effective in constraining the practices of all countries 
including China). 
124  See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii). 
125  See generally Appellate Body Report, United States — Tax Treatment for 
‘Foreign Sales Corporations’, WT/DS108/AB/R (adopted Mar. 20, 2000) [hereinafter 
US — FSC].  
126  Id. ¶ 90. 
127  US —FSC, supra note 125, at ¶¶ 7, 95. 
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conclusive as to whether the revenue foregone is “otherwise 
due.” 128  The appropriate benchmark for comparison must be 
identified and examined based on “the fiscal treatment of the 
relevant income for taxpayers in comparable situations.” 129 
Accordingly, the Appellate Body found that while foreign-source 
income of US citizens and residents was generally taxable, the 
contested measure exempted certain foreign-source income from 
tax amounting to foregoing revenue otherwise due.130 This legal 
test was refined in US – Aircraft (2nd complaint) where the 
Appellate Body explained that the comparison should involve “the 
tax treatment that applies to the alleged subsidy recipients and the 
tax treatment of comparable income of comparably situated 
taxpayers” in the jurisdiction concerned.131 The Appellate Body 
upheld the panel’s affirmative finding of foregoing of revenue 
otherwise due on the ground that the Washington State Business 
and Occupation Tax regime applied a lower tax rate to commercial 
aircraft and component manufacturers compared to the rates 
applicable to general manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing 
activities in the state.132 Finally, if a government does not collect 
the tax revenue in full at the time that it normally would under the 
comparable benchmark, that would also amount to foregoing of 
revenue otherwise due as the government effectively gives up the 
entitlement to “enjoy the cash available to it and earn interest on 
it.”133  
Preferential tax treatment is a well-known source of 
government support in China’s high-tech sector.134 For example, 
China’s new Corporate Income Tax Law 2008 provides for a 
reduced tax rate of 15 percent (as opposed to the standard rate of 
25percent) for High-New Technology Enterprises (HNTEs), and 
 
128  Appellate Body Report, United States–Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales 
Corporations’ – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, ¶ 88, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/RW (adopted Jan. 29, 2002). 
129  Id. ¶¶ 90–92.  
130  Id. ¶¶ 98–105.  
131  See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82, ¶¶ 812–13. 
132  Id. ¶¶ 816–31. 
133  Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and 
Charges, ¶ 5.220, WTO Doc. WT/DS472/AB/R, WT/DS497/AB/R (adopted 
Jan. 11, 2019). 
134  See generally TERENCE P. STEWART, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. 
COMM’N, CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL SUBSIDIES STUDY: HIGH TECHNOLOGY (2007), 
https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-industrial-subsidies-study-high-technology. 
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permissible reductions of costs and expenses for the R&D of new 
technology, products, and design more generally.135 To qualify as 
an HNTE, an entity must undertake R&D in one of the priority 
high-tech sectors 136  and satisfy a list of conditions including 
ownership of the proprietary IP rights of the core technology used 
in its production of goods or services.137 The law also directs local 
governments to provide other forms of tax preferences for newly-
established HNTEs in designated regions. 138  The Shanghai 
Pudong New Zone, for instance, provides for a tax exemption for 
the first two years of operation of HNTEs and a reduced tax rate 
of 12.5 percent for the following three years.139 More recently, 
similar tax incentives were extended to the services sector to 
stimulate investment in so-called Advanced Technology Services 
 
135  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa (中华人民共和国企业所
得税法) [Corporate Income Tax Law on People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), art. 28 (China). 
136  These sectors are consistent with the national policy plans discussed in Section 
II and may continue to change accordingly. The most updated criteria can be found in 
Gaoxin Jishu Qiye Rending Guanli Banfa （高新技术企业认定管理办法）  [The 
Measures on the Administration of the Qualification of High-New Technology Enterprises], 
(issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Finance and the State 
Taxation Administration on Jan. 29, 2016), www.most.gov.cn/tztg/201602/t20160204_12
3994.htm. Gaoxin Jishu Qiye Rending Guanli Gongzuo Zhiyin (高新技术企业认定管理
工作指引 ) [The Guidance on the Administration of the Qualification of High-New 
Technology Enterprises], (issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry 
of Finance and the State Taxation Administration June 22, 2016), 
www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c2200380/content.html.  
137  Guanyu Shishi GaoxinKeji Qiye Suodeshui Youhui Zhengce Youguan Wentide 
Gonggao (关于实施高薪科技企业所得税优惠政策有关问题的公告) 【The Notice on 
Several Questions Relating to the Implementation of Corporate Income Tax Incentives 
Policies for High-New Technology Enterprises] (issued by the State Taxation 
Administration June 19, 2017), www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c2684881/conte
nt.html. 
138  Corporate Income Tax Law on People’s Republic of China, supra note 135, 
art. 57. For clarifications made by the State Taxation Administration on the application of 
this provision, visit www.chinatax.gov.cn/chinatax/n810341/n810765/n812176/n812748/
c1193020/content.html. The designated regions include four Special Economic Zones in 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan, and the Shanghai Pudong New Zone. 
139  Guowuyuan Guanyu Jingji Tequ He Shanghai Pudong Xinqu Xin Sheli Gaoxin 
Jishu Qiye Shixing Guodu Xing Shuishou Youhui De Tongzhi (国务院关于经济特区和
上海浦东新区新设立高薪技术企业实行过度行税收优惠的通知) [Notice on the 
Application of Transitional Tax Incentives for Newly-Established High-New Technology 
Enterprises in Special Economic Zones and Shanghai Pudong New Zone] (issued by the 
State Council Feb. 26, 2007), www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_871687.htm. 
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Enterprises (ATSEs). 140  Qualified services include, inter alia, 
software development and technical support, IC design and test 
platform, information system and maintenance, business 
operation, and data-related services.141 Like HNTEs, ATSEs are 
eligible for a reduced tax rate of 15 percent and reductions of 
expenses associated with the education and training of 
employees. 142  Applying the WTO case law above, these tax 
incentives may be easily found to constitute “foregoing of 
government revenue otherwise due.” The benchmark for 
comparison would be the Chinese tax rules (e.g., corporate income 
tax rate and deductions) applicable to other entities in the same or 
comparable industries. Such industries may include those which 
produce the same or similar goods or services143 or more broadly, 
the entire manufacturing sector.144 To the extent that the reduced 
tax rate and favorable tax reductions are not applicable to the 
 
140  Guanyu Zai Fuwu Maoyi Chuangxin Fazhan Shidian Diqu Tuiguang Jishu 
Xianjin Xing Fuwu Qiye Suodeshui Youhui Zhengce De Tongzhi (关于在服务贸易创新
发展试点地区推广技术先进行服务企业所得税优惠政策的通知) [Notice on the 
Application of Corporate Income Tax Incentives for Advanced Technology Service 
Enterprises in Pilot Areas for Innovative Development of Service Trade] （issued by the 
Ministry of Finance, the State Taxation Administration, the Ministry of Commerce, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology and the National Development and Reform 
Commission Nov. 10, 2016), www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c2399212/content.
html. The initial 15 pilot areas include Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Hainan, 
Wuhan, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Suzhou, Weihai, Harbin New Zone, Jiangbei New Zone, 
Liangjiang New Zone and Guian New Zone. Guanyu Jiang Jishu Xianjin Xing Fuwu Qiye 
Suodeshui Zhengce Tuiguang Zhi Quangguo Shishi De Tongzhi (关于将技术先进行服
务企业所得税政策推广至全国实施的通知) [The Notice on the Nationwide Application 
of Corporate Income Tax Incentives for Advanced Technology Service Enterprises] 
（issued by the Ministry of Finance, the State Taxation Administration, the Ministry of 
Commerce, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the National Development and 
Reform Commission Nov. 2, 2017), www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c2908867/c
ontent.html. 
141  Id. Notice on the Application of Corporate Income Tax Incentives for Advanced 
Technology Service Enterprises in Pilot Areas for Innovative Development of Service 
Trade (2016); Notice on the Nationwide Application of Corporate Income Tax Incentives 
for Advanced Technology Service Enterprises (2017). 
142  Id. Notice on the Application of Corporate Income Tax Incentives for Advanced 
Technology Service Enterprises in Pilot Areas for Innovative Development of Service 
Trade (2016); Notice on the Nationwide Application of Corporate Income Tax Incentives 
for Advanced Technology Service Enterprises (2017). 
143  Appellate Body Report, United States–Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, ¶ 373, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter US — Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China)]. 
144  See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82, ¶¶ 816–31. 
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comparably situated entities, the tax incentives for HNTEs and 
ATSEs constitute “financial contributions.” This analysis applies 
to other tax preferences for the selected high-tech sectors. 
In addition, it is worth noting that duty and tax exemptions 
or remissions for exported products are excluded from being 
treated as a financial contribution in the form of foregoing of 
government revenue otherwise due.145 Therefore, value-added tax 
(VAT) rebates are generally permitted under ASCM—as long as 
the level of rebates does not go beyond the corresponding VAT 
rates—and have been widely used by WTO Members.146  This 
exception does not apply to import duty exemptions.147 However, 
a duty drawback scheme—that is, an import duty remission for 
inputs imported for the production of goods destined for export—
falls within the exception provided that the remission does not 
exceed the import duty actually levied.148 VAT rebates and duty 
drawbacks have been a major component of China’s export 
promotion policies.149 Recently, China made some adjustments to 
its VAT rebate scheme by increasing the rebate rates for eligible 
exports in general150 and allowing high-tech firms to use excess 
input VAT credits.151 Since the rebate rates are not in excess of the 
 
145  ASCM, supra note 17, art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii) n.1. 
146  See generally Youssef Benzarti and Alisa Tazhitdinova, Do Value-Added Taxes 
Affect International Trade Flows? Evidence from 30 Years of Tax Reforms (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 26195, 2019), www.nber.org/system/files/workin
g_papers/w26195/w26195.pdf. 
147  See Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automotive Industry, ¶¶ 91–92, WTO Doc. WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R (adopted 
June 19, 2000).  
148  Panel Report, European Union–Countervailing Measures on Certain 
Polyethylene Terephthalate from Pakistan, ¶¶ 7.29-30, WTO Doc. WT/DS486/R (adopted 
May 25, 2018); Appellate Body Report, European Union–Countervailing Measures on 
Certain Polyethylene Terephthalate from Pakistan, ¶¶ 5.68, 5.97–5.134, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS486/AB/R (adopted May 25, 2018). 
149  See generally Chi-Chur Chao et al., China’s Import Duty Drawback and VAT 
Rebate Policies: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 17 CHINA ECON. REV. 432 (2006). 
150  Guanyu Tigao Bufen Chanpin Chukou Tuishui Lu De Gonggao (关于提高部
分产品出口退税率的公告) [Notice on Increasing Tax Rebate Rates for Certain Exports], 
(issued by Ministry of Finance and State Taxation Administration Mar. 17, 2020), 
www.chinatax.gov.cn/chinatax/n810341/n810755/c5146338/content.html. 
151  Guanyu 2018 Nian Tuihuan Bufen Hangye Zengzhi Shui Liu Di Shuie 
Youguan Shuishou Zhengce De Tongzhi (关于年退换部分行业增值税留抵税额有关税
收政策的通知) [Notice on Refunds to Excess VAT Credits in Certain Industries in 2018], 
(issued by Ministry of Finance and State Taxation Administration June 27, 2018), 
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current VAT rate (13 percent), 152  the Chinese VAT scheme 
remains immune from the subsidy rules. Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that such policies are subject to the WTO non-
discrimination rules (e.g., GATT Articles I and III). In China – 
Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, for example, China had 
to cease its discriminatory application of VAT rebates for 
domestic enterprises in the software and IC industry, allegedly 
affecting around $2 billion worth of US exports to China.153 Thus, 
while the ASCM largely leaves out VAT rebate policies from its 
coverage, there are other rules that may be applied to restrain the 
use of such policies. In this regard, the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism has proved effective in restraining China’s use of 
subsidies in the high-tech sector and hence should continue to be 
used for that purpose.154  To the extent that VAT rebates may 
distort trade and hurt trading partners, it is for WTO Members to 
decide whether more discipline would be desirable via 
negotiations. The current lack of discipline on VAT rebates under 
the ASCM was agreed on by WTO Members and does not cause 
a deficiency problem specific to China. 
3. Provision of goods or services (other than general 
infrastructure) or purchase of goods — The third category of 
“financial contributions” concerns in-kind contributions in two 
forms: (1) the provision of goods or services to, and (2) the 
purchase of goods from, an enterprise by governments.155 While 
the former may “lower artificially the cost of producing a product 
by providing . . . inputs having a financial value”, the latter may 
“increase artificially the revenues gained from selling the 
product.”156 Goods or services may be provided through the grant 
of relevant rights leading to the use or enjoyment of the goods or 
 
www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c3556358/content.html (The Notice provided 
that the ten strategic sectors identified in the MIC 2025 should be prioritized for the refund 
of excess VAT credits). 
152  Id. 
153  For an official summary of this dispute, see DS 309: China–Value-Added Tax 
on Integrated Circuits, WTO, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds309_e.ht
m. For a discussion of the facts and settlement of the dispute, see WEIHUAN ZHOU, CHINA’S 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULINGS OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 17-9 (Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2019). 
154  Id. 
155  See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii). 
156  See US — Soft Lumber IV, supra note 83, ¶ 53. 
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services. For example, in US – Softwood Lumber IV, the Appellate 
Body found that Canada’s provincial stumpage arrangements 
amounted to a provision of goods by giving the eligible enterprises 
the right to cut standing timber and enjoy exclusive rights over the 
timber harvested.157 It ruled that the term “provide” requires “a 
reasonably proximate relationship between the action of the 
government . . . and the use or enjoyment of the good or service 
by the recipient”, and also the government to “have some control 
over the availability of” the thing being provided.158 Applying this 
reasoning, in US – Carbon Steel (India), the Appellate Body held 
that the grant of mining rights for iron ore and coal by the Indian 
government had a “reasonably proximate relationship” with “the 
use or enjoyment of the minerals by the beneficiaries of those 
rights.”159 In US – Aircraft (2nd complaint), the Appellate Body 
ruled that the provision of goods or services may be “done 
gratuitously or in exchange for consideration,” and hence captured 
the provision of access to NASA/USDOD facilities, equipment, 
and employees in exchange for scientific and technical 
information produced by Boeing.160  
The provision of goods or services in the form of “general 
infrastructure” is explicitly excluded from the coverage of 
subparagraph (iii). Thus, a distinction must be made between 
“infrastructure of a general nature” and other infrastructure.161 In 
EC – Aircraft, the panel observed that “general infrastructure” 
refers to “infrastructure that is not provided to or for the advantage 
of only a single entity or limited group of entities, but rather is 
available to all or nearly all entities.” 162  Therefore, even the 
provision of railroads or electrical distribution systems may fall 
within the ambit of subparagraph (iii) if they are made available 
only to a limited group of entities.163 Such limitations on access to 
or use of the infrastructure may arise in law—e.g., where the 
infrastructure is created for certain entities particular needs—or in 
effect—e.g., where although an explicit limitation is absent, only 
 
157  Id. ¶¶ 68–76.  
158  Id. ¶ 71. 
159  See US — Carbon Steel (India), supra note 93, ¶¶ 4.60–4.74. 
160  See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82,¶¶ 616, 623–24. 
161  See US — Soft Lumber IV, supra note 83, ¶ 60. 
162  See EC – Aircraft, supra note 89, ¶ 7.1036.  
163  Id. ¶ 7.1039. 
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certain entities have access to the infrastructure.164 Based on these 
observations, the panel found sufficient evidence to show that the 
facilities involved were created for use by Airbus although they 
were also intended to serve certain public policy goals and may be 
open for public use in the future.165 
The provision of production inputs, particularly land and 
electricity, at preferential rates has been prevalent in the Chinese 
high-tech sector.166 For example, in order to attract the world’s 
leading tech firms to establish research centres in the Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous Region, the local government currently 
provides land use right for free for the first three years and at half 
price for another two years.167 Similarly, to accelerate the growth 
of the Linyi High-Tech Zone in Shandong province, the local 
government offers a 15% discount of land use fees, preferential 
access to electricity, water, and other essential resources and 
facilities, amongst a variety of other supportive policies. 168  In 
Hubei province, high-tech companies in the Guanggu Future Tech-
City are entitled to discounted electricity rates leading to an annual 
cost saving of approximately RMB 150 million.169 The Guizhou 
provincial government recently reduced the electricity rate to 
RMB 0.35/Kilowatt hour for big data companies in Guian New 
Zone and for all 5G base stations in the region (in light of the New 
Infrastructure Initiative discussed in Section II) while the standard 
rate for industrial use is between RMB 0.48-0.64/Kilowatt hour.170 
 
164  Id. ¶ 7.1043. 
165  Id. ¶¶ 7.1080–1084. 
166  See, e.g., Mandy Meng Fang, A Crisis or An Opportunity? The Trade War 
between the US and China in the Solar PV Sector, 54 J. OF WORLD TRADE 103 (2020).  
167  广西壮族自治区人民政府关于实施创新驱动发展战略的决定 [Decision on 
Implementing the Plan of Innovation Driven Development] (promulgated by the Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous Region Government, Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.waizi.org.cn/poli
cy/81312.html.  
168  临沂高新技术产业开发区招商引资的有关规定  [Regulations on the 
Business and Investment Invitation in Linyi High-Tech Industrial Development Zone] 
(promulgated by Linyi Municipal Government, Dec. 5, 2019) § 3 art. 2, www.lytoday.co
m/kfly/yhzc/2013-12/17/content_1600.htm. 
169  Jin Ji, Shen Jia, & Zhao Jingwen, High-tech Enterprises in Guanggu Future 
High City Enjoy Preferential Electricity Prices, SINA NEWS (May 25, 2014), http://news.
sina.com.cn/o/2014-05-24/054030218040.shtml. 
170  It is reported that Huawei, Apple and Tencent will establish their big data 
centres in Guian New Zone as planned. See New Infrastructure Brings New Development 
Opportunities for Big Data Industry in Guizhou, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Apr. 22, 2020), 
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There is little doubt that these measures are input subsidies in the 
form of provision of goods or services (i.e. electricity distribution 
and water allocation). Although these subsidies involve land and 
electricity generation and distribution, only selected industries, 
projects or companies are eligible for preferential access and 
discounted rates.171  
Another major form of input subsidies is the provision of 
input materials, such as steel, aluminum, and a range of raw 
materials and rare earths (e.g. bauxite, iron ores, coking coal) that 
are essential for the high-tech sector.172 The key concern here is 
related to the significant market distortions in these upstream 
industries which have long been subject to industrial policies and 
dominated by SOEs.173 However, as will be discussed in the sub-
sections below, this concern is not so much about whether the 
provision of input materials constitutes a type of “financial 
contributions” but about (1) whether the input suppliers are 
“public bodies” and (2) whether these inputs are supplied at less 
than adequate remuneration so that a benefit is conferred on the 
downstream users in the high-tech sector. In practice, energy and 
 
http://sciTechnologypeople.com.cn/n1/2020/0422/c432330-31683603.html; Press Release, 
Guizhou Communications Administration, Guizhou Autonomous Prefecture Issues Policy 
to Reduce the Cost of Electricity Generation for 5G Industry and Promote Industrial 
Development, (July 23, 2020), 
http://gzca.miit.gov.cn/xwdt/gzdt/art/2020/art_3b5055f9baab4c5693b7c730ad2eda
ac.html. 
171  See Jin et al. supra note 169; New Infrastructure Brings New Development 
Opportunities for Big Data Industry in Guizhou, supra note 170; 广西壮族自治区人民政
府关于实施创新驱动发展战略的决定 [Decision on Implementing the Plan of Innovation 
Driven Development]; 临沂高新技术产业开发区招商引资的有关规定 [Regulations on 
the Business and Investment Invitation in Linyi High-Tech Industrial Development Zone]; 
Guizhou Autonomous Prefecture Issues Policy to Reduce the Cost of Electricity Generation 
for 5G Industry and Promote Industrial Development, supra note 170. 
172  See generally OECD, A First Look at the Steel Industry in the Context of Global 
Value Chains, DSTI/SC(2017)4 (Mar. 16, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DSTI/S
C(2017)4/en/pdf; OECD, Measuring Distortions in International Markets: the Aluminum 
Value Chain, (OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 218, 2019), www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/trade/measuring-distortions-in-international-markets-the-aluminium-value-
chain_c82911ab-en [hereinafter OECD Aluminum Report]; WAYNE M. MORRISON & 
RACHEL TANG, CONG. RES. SERV., CHINA’S RARE EARTH INDUSTRY AND EXPORT 
REGIME: ECONOMIC AND TRADE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1–4 (2012), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42510.pdf. 
173  OECD Aluminum Report, supra note 172; MORRISON & TANG, supra note 172, 
at 1–4.  
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material input subsidies have been some of the most frequent 
targets in countervailing actions against China.174 
The other category of in-kind contributions under 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the ASCM concerns governments’ 
purchase of goods. The case law has clarified that such purchases 
are usually for consideration175 and may involve a government 
acquiring things for its own use or for others to use, such as resale 
to end users of electricity. 176  However, although the text of 
subparagraph (iii) does not include purchases of “services”, in 
US – Aircraft (2nd complaint) the Appellate Body did not endorse 
the panel’s decision that the drafters of the ASCM intended to 
exclude purchases of services, thereby leaving this question open 
for discussion in future disputes.177 
Government procurement has been an important driver of 
indigenous innovation in China.178 A series of national policies 
and regulatory documents, which are also implemented through 
numerous local government policies, mandated or encouraged 
preferential government procurement of high-tech products and 
services supplied by qualified Chinese entities. 179  The NEV 
 
174  See generally CAPITAL TRADE INCORPORATED, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND 
SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, AN ASSESSMENT OF CHINA’S SUBSIDIES TO STRATEGIC 
AND HEAVYWEIGHT INDUSTRIES, (Mar. 23, 2009), www.uscc.gov/research/assessment-
chinas-subsidies-strategic-and-heavyweight-industries. 
175  See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82, ¶ 620. 
176  Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector/Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R (May 24, 2013), ¶¶ 7.225–7.227; Appellate Body Report, 
Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector/Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R, 
WT/DS426/AB/R (May 24, 2013), ¶ 5.124. 
177  See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82, ¶ 620. 
178  See generally U.S.-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, UPDATE: CHINA’S INNOVATION & 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES (May 2015), www.uschina.org/reports/update-
chinas-innovation-government-procurement-policies. 
179  See, e.g., The National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology 
Development Plan for 2006-2020, supra note 25; 自主创新产品政府采购评审办法 
[Notice on the Assessment Criteria of Government Procurement of Home-Grown 
Innovation Products] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, Apr. 3, 2007), ST. COUNCIL 
GAZ., Feb. 5, 2008, chap. III, www.gov.cn/ztzl/kjfzgh/content_883671.htm; 自主创新产
品政府采购预算管理办法 [Notice on the Measures of Administrating the Budget for 
Government Procurement of Home-Grown Innovation Products], (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Finance, Apr. 3, 2007), ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Feb. 5, 2008, www.gov.cn/ztzl/kj
fzgh/content_883710.htm. However, it is noted that the latter two policies were phased out 
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industry, for instance, has been a major beneficiary of such 
policies that set specific NEV purchase targets for government 
entities and public institutions at both national and local levels.180 
One of the most recent policy developments is an opinion issued 
by the State Council which encourages government entities to 
increase purchases of innovative technologies, goods, and 
services from medium and small-sized tech firms in High-Tech 
Industrial Development Zones.181 It is anticipated that this policy 
will be implemented in the 168 high-tech zones currently listed by 
the Ministry of Science and Technology. 182  Like government 
provision of goods or services, the major issue relating to the 
preferential public procurement of high-tech goods is not whether 
it constitutes a “financial contribution” but whether the purchases 
are made at more than adequate remuneration. Although the issue 
of whether government purchases of services may be treated as 
“financial contributions” remains unsettled, this lack of clarity 
does not create a problem that is specific to China, and any further 
development of the case law will apply to all WTO Members.  
Moreover, it is worth noting that China is actively 
negotiating to join the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement which sets forth rules (e.g., non-discrimination) on 
government procurement activities that are not available under the 
 
in 2011 by the Ministry of Finance. For a summary of some of the national and local 
policies, see U.S.-China Bus. Council, supra note 178. For a general discussion of 
government procurement in the high-tech sector, see Daniel C.K. Chow, China’s 
Indigenous Innovation Policies and the World Trade Organization, 34 NW. J. INT’L LAW 
& BUS. 81 (2013).  
180  关于印发政府机关及公共机构购买新能源汽车实施方案的通知 [Notice on 
Issuing the implementation Plan of Government Agencies and Public Institutions’ 
Purchases of New Energy Vehicles] (promulgated by the Government Offices 
Administration of the State Council, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the National 
Development and Reform Commission on July 14, 2014, www.caam.org.cn/chn/9/cate_9
9/con_5124489.html. 
181  See 关于促进国家高新技术产业开发区高质量发展的若干意见 [Opinions 
on Enhancing the High-Quality Development of National High-Tech Industrial Zones] 
(promulgated by the State Council, July 13, 2020), ST. COUNCIL GAZ. July 17, 2020, ¶ 8, 
www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2020-07/17/content_5527765.htm. 
182  High-Tech Industrial Development Zone, MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY, www.most.gov.cn/gxjscykfq/. 
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existing WTO agreements. 183  China proposed enhancing its 
market access commitments by broadening the scope of covered 
procurement to include goods and services sectors within strategic 
industries. 184  These rules and commitments would provide 
additional, more specific discipline on China’s government 
procurement activities, thereby reducing the need to resort to the 
ASCM.  
In addition, China is subject to an even broader WTO-plus 
obligation regarding the purchase and sale activities of SOEs and 
State-invested enterprises (SIEs). Section 6.1 of the Accession 
Protocol, as elaborated by paragraph 46 of the Working Party 
Report, requires the Chinese government to ensure that:  
[A]ll state-owned and state-invested enterprises 
would make purchases and sales based solely on 
commercial considerations, e.g. price, quality, 
marketability and availability, and that the 
enterprises of other WTO Members would have 
an adequate opportunity to compete for sales to 
and purchases from these enterprises on non-
discriminatory terms and conditions. In addition, 
the Government of China would not influence, 
directly or indirectly, commercial decisions on 
the part of state-owned or state-invested 
enterprises, including on the quantity, value or 
country of origin of any goods purchased or sold, 
except in a manner consistent with the WTO 
Agreement.185 
While this obligation has never been utilized before, hence its 
exact scope remains debatable, it seems to go beyond a mere non-
discrimination rule and provide a more comprehensive restriction 
on the anti-competitive conduct of SOEs and SIEs including 
 
183  The Agreement on Government Procurement is a plurilateral agreement that 
applies to signatories only. For an official introduction of the agreement, see WTO and 
Government Procurement, WORLD TRADE ORG., www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/
gproc_e.htm. For a discussion of the application of the relevant WTO rules on government 
procurement in China’s high-tech sector, see Chow, supra note 179, at 98–104. 
184  China Submits Revised Offer for Joining Government Procurement Pact, 
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 23, 2019), www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/gpro_23o
ct19_e.htm. 
185  See Working Party Report, supra 78, ¶ 46. 
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government purchases and sales of goods and services.186 Thus, 
the ASCM is not, nor is it intended to be, the sole source of 
discipline on government procurement and sales activities that 
may cause market distortions and adversely affect other WTO 
Members. 
4. Income or price support — Article 1.1(a)(2) sets out a 
residual category, namely, “any form of income or price support” 
within the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT. While this 
category has further broadened the “range of government 
measures capable of providing subsidies,”187 its exact scope of 
coverage remains unsettled. In China – GOES, the panel rejected 
an effect-based approach to the determination of “price 
support.”188The contested measure was the voluntary restraint 
agreements (VRAs) concluded under the US Steel Import 
Stabilization Act 1984 which restricted the volume of steel 
imports into the US market.189 China contended that the VRAs 
effectively raised domestic steel prices, thereby causing a transfer 
of wealth from steel purchasers to the US steel industry.190 The 
panel held that whether a government action constitutes a covered 
subsidy should be “determined by reference to the 
action . . . concerned, rather than . . . the effects of the measure on 
a market.”191 More specifically, the term “price support”, in the 
panel’s view, “does not include all government intervention that 
may have an effect on prices, such as tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions.” 192  Rather, it concerns “direct government 
intervention in the market with the design to fix the price of a good 
at a particular level, for example, through purchase of surplus 
production when price is set above equilibrium” as opposed to “a 
random change in price merely being a side-effect of any form of 
 
186  For a more detailed discussion of this obligation (in comparison to GATT 
Article XVII:1 on State Trading Enterprises), see Weihuan Zhou et al., Building A Market 
Economy Through WTO-Inspired Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in China, 68 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 977, 997–1001, 1011–12 (2019). 
187  See US – Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 83, ¶ 52.  
188  See generally Panel Report, China Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Grain Oriented Flat-rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS414/R (June 15, 2012).  
189  Id. ¶¶ 7.35, 7.79.  
190  Id.  
191  Id. ¶ 7.85.  
192  Id. ¶ 7.85.  
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government measure.”193 Since the VRAs did not involve direct 
control of price by the US government, the panel rejected China’s 
claim that they constituted a subsidy in the form of price 
support. 194  To date, this ruling remains the only detailed 
consideration of the meaning of “income or price support.” 
Nevertheless, the effect-based approach to the determination of 
subsidies has been consistently rejected in other disputes. For 
example, in US – Export Restraints, the panel refused to treat 
export restraints as a “financial contribution” despite their 
potential trade-distorting effect.195  
We did not identify any measure that directly sets price or 
income levels in China’s high-tech sector. As a result of the case 
law above, measures that may cause price distortions indirectly 
may not be captured by this residual category. One such measure 
that has been hotly debated in recent years concerns China’s 
export restraints, mainly in the form of export quotas and taxes, 
on raw materials and rare earths.196  While these measures are 
apparently adopted to protect the security of exhaustible natural 
resources and the environment,197 they may cause domestic input 
prices to fall, thereby conferring a cost advantage on downstream 
entities in the high-tech sector, such as semiconductors and 
NEVs.198 Despite the potential price effects, export restraints do 
not amount to a government’s direct control of price in light of the 
panel decision in US – Export Restraints. Therefore, whether they 
may constitute a covered subsidy remains debatable.199  
However, as discussed above, the ASCM is not the sole 
source of discipline that may be employed to tackle trade-
 
193  Id. ¶ 7.86 (emphasis added). 
194  Id. ¶ 7.88.  
195  See Panel Report, United States — Measures Treating Exports Restraints as 
Subsidies, WTO doc. WT/DS194/R (adopted Aug. 23, 2001) ¶¶ 8.62–8.75. 
196  See Bown & Hillman, supra note 53, at 568–69, 574. 
197  《中 国 的 稀 土 状 况 与 政 策》[Situations and Policies of China’s Rare 
Earth Industry], INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, (June 20, 2012), 
www.gov.cn/zhengce/2012-06/20/content_2618561.htm. 
198  See Marco Bronckers & Keith Maskus, China — Raw Materials: A 
Controversial Step Towards Evenhanded Exploitation of Natural Resources, 13 WORLD 
TRADE REVIEW 393, 402–04 (2014). 
199  But see Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT, supra note 54, at 383–
84 (arguing that the negotiating history of GATT Article XVI:1 has suggested that the 
definition of subsidy may be broadly interpreted to cover indirect subsidies that increase 
the export of any products). 
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distortive export measures or price distortions. Under the general 
WTO rules, all export restrictions other than duties, taxes or other 
charges are prohibited under GATT Article XI:1. Anti-dumping 
duties have been routinely applied to address price distortions 
derived from the raw materials market affecting the price of final 
goods.200  
In addition, China has undertaken two relevant WTO-plus 
obligations. Under Section 11.3 of its Accession Protocol, China 
agrees to “eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports” 
except for a list of 84 tariff items subject to a bound export duty 
from 20 to 50 percent. Many raw materials, such as bauxite, coke, 
fluorspar, magnesium, silicon metal, zinc, and a wide spectrum of 
rare earths, are not included in the list and hence must not be 
subject to export taxes.201  This WTO-plus obligation has been 
applied to successfully challenge China’s export taxes on raw 
materials and rare earths in two consecutive disputes. 202  This 
obligation significantly limited China’s policy space in using 
export taxes for legitimate regulatory goals, while other WTO 
Members are free to and do apply such taxes for similar goals.203  
More broadly, China also undertakes to “allow prices for 
traded goods and services in every sector to be determined by 
market forces” under Section 9.1 of the Accession Protocol. Only 
a short list of exempted goods and services – which does not cover 
the strategic high-tech sectors – may be subject to government 
 
200  See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/DS473/AB/R (adopted Oct. 26, 2016). For a detailed 
discussion of this report, see Weihuan Zhou, Appellate Body Report on EU−Biodiesel: The 
Future of China’s State Capitalism under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, (2018)17(4) 
World Trade Review 603.  
201  Accession Protocol, supra note 77, Annex 6.  
202  See WTO Panel Report, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (adopted 
Feb. 22, 2012); Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R (adopted 
Feb. 22, 2012). WTO Panel Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare 
Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R, WT/DS433/R (adopted 
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Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, 
WT/DS433/AB/R (adopted Aug. 29, 2014). 
203  Jeonghoi Kim, ‘Recent Trends in Export Restrictions on Raw Materials’ in 
OECD, The Economic Impact of Export Restrictions on Raw Materials (Paris, OECD 
Publishing, 2010) 15–20.  
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pricing or government guidance pricing. 204  Apparently, this 
obligation has the potential to extend beyond “price or income 
control” to capture Chinese government intervention in all sectors, 
other than the few exemptions, where it affects prices directly or 
indirectly, although its exact scope of application will need to be 
tested in future disputes.205 Despite its potential, this obligation 
has never been utilized by WTO Members to challenge the 
allegedly wide-ranging activities of the Chinese government, 
including those through SOEs and SIEs that may have prevented 
prices from being determined by market forces. Therefore, while 
it is worthwhile for there to be further discussion about whether 
the ASCM may or should be expanded to apply to export restraints 
or other types of price-distortive measures that do not explicitly 
take the form of the covered subsidies, it is also important to 
recognize that the other WTO rules, particularly the broad China-
specific obligations, already offer certain solutions to the 
challenges arising from State intervention and market distortions 
in China. 
B. Public Body 
The interpretation of what constitutes a “public body” 
under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the ASCM is critical to ensuring that 
only the conduct of governments is captured. In its landmark 
decision in US – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), 
the Appellate Body developed a “function/authority-based” 
approach to the determination of “public body” while rejecting an 
“ownership-based” approach proposed by the US and applied by 
the panel to decide that China’s State-owned commercial banks 
were “public bodies” just because these entities were majority 
owned or controlled by the Chinese government. 206  More 
specifically, the Appellate Body ruled that a “public 
body . . . must be an entity that possesses, exercises or is vested 
with governmental authority” to exercise governmental 
functions.207 Such authority may be established based on evidence 
showing “an explicit statutory delegation” or “a sustained and 
 
204  See Accession Protocol, supra note 77, § 9.2; Annex 4. 
205  See Zhou et al., supra note 186, at 1012–14.  
206  See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143, 
¶¶ 277–78.  
207  Id. ¶¶ 317–18.  
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systematic practice.” 208  The existence of mere formal links 
between an entity and government, such as the government 
holding a majority interest in the entity, in itself is unlikely to be 
sufficient evidence.209 However, “where the evidence shows that 
the formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there 
is also evidence that such control has been exercised in a 
meaningful way, then such evidence may permit an inference that 
the entity concerned is exercising governmental authority.”210 In 
any event, the determination of whether an entity is a “public body” 
requires consideration of all relevant characteristics or features of 
the entity, its relationship with government, and must not be 
exclusively or unduly based on any single characteristic.211 While 
rejecting the panel’s interpretative approach, the Appellate Body 
upheld the panel’s ultimate finding that the Chinese State-owned 
commercial banks constituted “public bodies” based on evidence 
relating to (1) state ownership, (2) laws that mandate or request 
implementation or consideration of government policies, and (3) 
influence of the government or the Communist Party of China 
(hereinafter CPC or Party) on management and decision-
making.212  
Most recently, the Appellate Body revisited the 
“function/authority-based” approach in detail in US – 
Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.5).213 This dispute 
arose out of the United States’ continued application of the 
“ownership-based” approach in finding that Chinese SOEs and 
SIEs providing inputs for the production of certain goods, 
including certain pipes, steel and aluminium products, wind power, 
and solar panels, were “public bodies” in a range of countervailing 
investigations. 214  The panel found the US in breach of 
 
208  Id. ¶ 318.  
209  Id. 
210  Id. 
211  Id. ¶ 319. 
212  See id. ¶¶ 350, 355. 
213  Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Duty Measures on 
Certain Products from China – Resources to Article 21.5 of the DSU by China, 
WT/DS437/AB/RW (adopted Aug. 15, 2019) [hereinafter US — Countervailing Measures 
(Article 21.5 – China)]. 
214  WTO Panel Report, United States — Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS437/R (adopted Jan. 16, 2015), ¶ 7.1.  
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Article 1.1(a)(1) in the original proceedings.215 In the compliance 
proceedings, the US primarily relied on a Public Bodies 
Memorandum (accompanied by a CPC Memorandum) and 
China’s responses to the Public Body Questionnaire, which 
included evidence to support the “authority-based” approach.216 
In addition to government ownership, the evidence included, inter 
alia, China’s national industrial policies, the role of the Chinese 
government and the CPC in the firms’ management and 
governance, the provision of direct and indirect benefits to 
incentivize the firms to follow the policy directives, and the 
influence of these policies, government/Party role and incentives 
on the firms’ behaviour and activities. 217  The Memorandum 
concluded that (1) all SOEs are “public bodies”; (2) SIEs may be 
subject to government industrial policies, hence exercising 
governmental functions; (3) entities with little or no formal 
government ownership may be controlled or influenced by the 
Chinese government in a meaningful manner; and (4) the control 
of the Party is equivalent to the control of the State.218 China’s 
core contention was that the United States’ authorities failed to 
apply the correct legal test. More specifically, China submitted 
that the “authority-based” test “require[s] a particular degree or 
nature of connection in all cases between an identified government 
function and the particular financial contribution at issue,” and 
hence cannot be satisfied by “an abstract review of China’s system 
of governance and state functions.”219 Both the compliance panel 
and the Appellate Body disagreed. The Appellate Body clarified 
that the focus of the test is on the entity concerned and its 
relationship with government as opposed to the conduct alleged to 
give rise to a “financial contribution” although evidence relating 
to conduct may be indicative of the underlying functions of the 
entity.220 Therefore, it is unnecessary to show that the entity is 
 
215  Id. ¶¶ 7.60–7.75.  
216  WTO Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China – Resources to Article 21.5 of the DSU by China, WT/DS437/RW 
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“meaningfully controlled” by the government in the specific 
conduct.221 Once an entity is found to be a “public body,” then all 
its conduct “is directly attributable to” the government of the 
Member concerned.222 Although the Appellate Body refused to 
consider whether the Public Bodies Memorandum is in violation 
of Article 1.1(a)(1), 223  its decision suggested that evidence 
showing a sufficient degree of government control of the activities 
of an entity in general leading to the exercise of governmental 
functions by the entity would satisfy the “authority-based” test.224 
The “authority-based” test has been one of the most 
criticized elements of the current subsidy rules.225 Many believe 
that given China’s State-led economic model and the dominant 
role of SOEs in economic activities, this test creates a substantial 
hurdle to identifying “public bodies” and is consequently deficient 
in tackling subsidies granted via SOEs.226 This issue is a major 
ground for reforms of the subsidy rules proposed by the US-EU-
Japan joint statement227 and by Bown and Hillman.228  
The “authority-based” approach is preferable to the 
“ownership-based” approach. 229  This is because under that 
approach, the definition of “public body” does not overreach to 
cover all SOEs or SIEs, regardless of whether an entity exercises 
a public policy function as an agent of governments or purely 
engages in commercial activities. Since public sectors remain 
significant in many countries,230 an adoption of the “ownership-
based” approach may well cause an issue of over-inclusiveness 
and attract the same degree of criticisms as its counterpart has 
received. More importantly, the WTO tribunals’ application of the 
“authority-based” approach is reasonably balanced by requiring 
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some evidence beyond ownership without imposing excessively 
high evidentiary standards. As the major evidence required under 
the “authority-based” approach, China’s industrial policies, 
directives, and other regulatory instruments as well as the 
involvement of the State/Party in corporate management and 
governance are widely documented and are readily accessible 
nowadays. 231  In addition, China’s ongoing SOE reforms have 
explicitly classified certain entities as Public Welfare SOEs and 
Special Commercial SOEs to undertake governmental functions 
and have mandated the creation of a Party Committee in all SOEs 
to influence the decision-making of these entities.232 These recent 
developments provide more positive evidence to support findings 
of “public bodies.” In reality, investigating authorities in major 
jurisdictions have already collected abundant evidence and have 
often resorted to other relevant evidence collected by each other 
in countervailing investigations. 233  Significantly, the Appellate 
Body’s ruling that the “public body” determination does not 
require one to show that the specific conduct of the entity 
concerned is “meaningfully controlled” by the Chinese 
government further reduced the evidentiary burden on 
investigating authorities. Therefore, the totality of the evidence 
identified above would be sufficient to establish a prime facie case 
which would be difficult for the Chinese government to rebut. In 
both disputes where the “authority-based” approach was 
developed and applied, the WTO tribunals did not disagree with 
the investigating authorities on the findings that the evidence on 
the record was sufficient to show China’s State banks and 
SOEs/SIEs providing inputs to manufacture were meaningfully 
controlled by the Chinese government to exercise governmental 
functions. Similarly, it would not be hard to establish that the 
investment funds discussed in sub-section A(i) are “public bodies” 
 
231  China has made most laws, regulations and policies available online as part of 
its WTO obligations on transparency. See generally Henry Gao, ‘The WTO’s Transparency 
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based on the majority ownership of the Chinese government,234 
the relevant industrial policies, and other evidence showing that 
the funds are essentially government investment vehicles vested 
with the authority to promote the growth of the selected industries. 
In short, while one may continue to debate the legitimacy and 
efficacy of the “authority-based” test, the case law seems to have 
evolved in a direction that makes “public bodies” easier to prove 
than to defend. 
C. Private Entities “Entrusted or Directed” 
While the ASCM is primarily concerned with the conduct 
of governments, it does not ignore the possibility that Members 
may circumvent their obligations by making a financial 
contribution indirectly through a private entity.235 To prevent such 
circumvention, it provides that the conduct of a private entity may 
also constitute the provision of subsidies if it is “entrusted” or 
“directed” by governments to do so. 236  The key interpretative 
issue, therefore, concerns the meaning of “entrustment” and 
“direction.” In US – DRAMs, the Appellate Body observed that 
these terms, respectively, involve the giving of responsibility to 
(entrustment) or exercise of authority over (direction) an entity, as 
a proxy of government, in both formal and informal ways “in 
order to effectuate a financial contribution.”237 Both terms require 
“a demonstrable link between the government and the conduct of 
the private body” and “a more active role [of the government] than 
mere acts of encouragement,” and hence do not cover any 
government intervention which may or may not lead to the 
conduct of the private entity.238 In this regard, the panel found that 
despite (1) the existence of a bailout policy seeking to prevent the 
 
234  For example, the major shareholders of the first tranche of the IC Fund included 
the Ministry of Finance (25.95%), China Development Bank Finance (23.07%), China 
National Tobacco (14.42%), and Beijing E-Town International Investment and 
Development (7.21%), and China Mobile (7.21%). See Yanpeng Chen, The Second 
Tranche of the National IC Fund Continues to Focus on Semiconductors and May Attract 
More Than 1 Trillion Private Investment, SINA NEWS (June 16, 2020), 
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on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs) from Korea, 
WT/DS296/AB/R (adopted July 20, 2005) ¶¶ 110–11, 113 [hereinafter US — DRAMs]. 
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financial collapse of Hynix and (2) the fact that the Korean 
government had some capacity to influence the private body 
creditors, the evidence did not demonstrate that the Korean 
government “availed itself of that capacity to entrust or direct” the 
creditors to participate in the bailout.239 The Appellate Body later 
overturned the panel’s finding on the ground that the panel 
examined individual pieces of evidence in isolation rather than the 
totality of the evidence.240 However, the Appellate Body did not 
consider whether the evidence before the panel, in its totality, was 
sufficient to substantiate “entrustment or direction.”241  
Subsequent decisions offer more guidance on the 
evidentiary standard for “entrustment” and “direction.” For 
example, in dealing with similar issues relating to the participation 
of private body creditors in the bailout of Hynix in Japan – 
DRAMs (Korea), the Appellate Body dismissed the panel’s 
observation that entrustment or direction cannot be established if 
a financial transaction (such as a loan) is undertaken on 
commercial terms, although “the commercial unreasonableness of 
the financial transactions is a relevant factor.” 242  Instead, the 
Appellate Body opined that a “government could entrust or direct 
a creditor to make a loan, which that creditor then does on 
commercial terms.” 243  This suggests that the establishment of 
“entrustment” or “direction” does not rely on whether the financial 
contribution concerned confers a benefit. In the context of 
interpreting “public body” in US – Anti-dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China), the Appellate Body confirmed 
that like the term “public,” the term “private” also “encompass[es] 
notions of authority as well as of control.”244 As suggested by the 
Appellate Body in US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 
21.5), the major difference is that if conduct is carried out by a 
private entity, then it must be demonstrated that a “link” exists 
“between the government and that [specific] conduct” in the form 
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of “entrustment or direction,” which is not required in the 
determination of “public body” as discussed above. 245 
Accordingly, in US – Supercalendered Paper, the panel held that 
a measure that merely imposed a general obligation on an entity 
to provide electricity service did not amount to an “entrustment or 
direction” of the entity to provide such service to a specific 
customer at any given rate. 246  This ruling confirms that 
“entrustment or direction cannot be inadvertent or a mere by-
product of governmental regulation” 247  and that additional 
evidence is needed to show the conduct concerned is entrusted or 
directed by a government.  
The concern about the role of private entities in China has 
two major, related claims. The more extreme claim is that given 
the complicated web of relationships between the State, the Party, 
and firms in China, all firms may be influenced by the 
government. 248  This claim indicates that the entire Chinese 
economy is distorted by State intervention. While one cannot deny 
that such State/Party-Firm relationships or networks exist, 
evidence on the actual or even potential impact on the decisions 
of private firms is much less robust compared with the evidence 
of such impact on SOEs.249  In contrast, recent studies tend to 
suggest the opposite. As leading China expert Nicholas Lardy has 
observed, with the increasingly significant role of private firms in 
the Chinese economy, “most markets are now competitive.”250 
Even with the recent resurgence of the role of the State and SOEs, 
State influence remains concentrated in selected sectors and 
private firms have continued to maintain financial performance 
and efficiency at levels considerably higher than those of SOEs.251 
Thus, it is unjustified to regard all business activities of private 
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firms as being directed by the Chinese government. Rather, 
whether such activities are so directed or influenced must be 
established on a case-by-case basis. This view lends support to the 
interpretative approach developed by the Appellate Body 
requiring the demonstration of “entrustment” or “direction” of the 
specific conduct concerned. 
The other claim is that given the industrial policies and 
the significant involvement of the State in market activities in 
selected sectors, including the high-tech sector, private firms are 
incentivized to increase business activities in these sectors and 
even to grant financial or other support to certain firms or projects 
pursuant to the instructions of governments in exchange for 
business opportunities and other commercial benefits. 252  This 
claim has merit if one considers China’s New Infrastructure 
Initiative and government-led investment funds in the high-tech 
sector which have promoted massive and growing private 
investment in the selected industries as discussed earlier. 253 
However, the possibility that private actors may be so incentivized 
does not necessarily mean they are acting in the interest of the 
government instead of their own in all cases. Maintaining a good 
relationship with governments, making an investment based on 
policy and regulatory developments, or running a short-term loss 
for long-term benefits are typical examples of reasonable 
commercial decisions. Such conduct is by no means conclusive as 
to whether a private entity exercises a governmental function. 
Again, an inquiry into whether the contested conduct is entrusted 
or directed by governments would be needed. 
To this end, one may remain concerned about the 
State/Party’s “invisible hand” in the Chinese economy that may 
effectively influence private firms’ conduct similarly to how it 
influences State entities.254 However, whether the degree, breadth, 
and effectiveness of such influence is actually similar requires 
more solid empirical evidence. The Chinese government is 
significantly more inclined to use SOEs rather than private entities 
to implement policy objectives, hence the extensive support for 
 
252  See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng, ‘Beyond Ownership: 
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the former to the detriment of the latter.255 This also suggests that 
the conduct of private entities must not be presumed to be 
entrusted or directed by governments. Accordingly, we submit 
that the current law on subsidies strikes a proper balance by 
including private entities as potential suppliers of subsidies while 
imposing a higher evidentiary standard for establishing that such 
entities actually act for the government as compared with the 
evidence required in establishing SOEs as “public bodies.” This 
balanced approach reasonably reflects the focus of WTO rules on 
the conduct of governments as opposed to that of corporate 
entities especially private ones.256 The more remotely an entity is 
related to a government, the higher the evidentiary standard 
should be in establishing that the conduct of the entity is 
attributable to the government. To the extent that this higher 
evidentiary standard makes it more difficult for a complainant to 
prove “entrustment” or “direction” than for a respondent to defend, 
the escalation is logical and the difficulty applies to all WTO 
Members as amply demonstrated in past disputes such as those 
involving Korea’s bailout of Hynix through private creditors.257 
Therefore, even accepting that the current legal test creates certain 
problems due to the high evidentiary standard in identifying 
subsidies through private entities, the problems are not specific to 
China. If the Chinese government decides to further strengthen its 
“control” of or “influence” on private entities,258 it only provides 
more evidence for other countries to establish “entrustment” or 
“direction.” 
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D. Benefits Conferred 
A government action that constitutes a “financial 
contribution” or “price or income support” would not be regarded 
as a “subsidy” unless it has conferred a benefit to the recipient.259 
In developing the legal test of “benefit conferred,” WTO tribunals 
have relied on Article 14 as an immediate context.260 In essence, 
Article 14 states that the calculation of benefit shall be based on 
the extent to which a financial contribution has been made “on 
terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the 
market.”261 Accordingly, the test of “benefit conferred” focuses on 
the “recipient” or “benefit to the recipient” rather than the 
government/subsidy provider or “cost to government.”262 Thus, in 
EC – Aircraft, the mere fact that government investment in 
infrastructure exceeded its return on that investment, though 
relevant, was not determinative of whether a benefit was 
conferred.263 Rather, one needs to compare the situations with or 
without the government action, that is, whether the action made 
the recipient “better off” than it would have been in the absence 
of it.264 The benchmark for comparison is the marketplace such 
that the central inquiry is whether a financial contribution is 
provided “on terms more advantageous than those [that would 
have been] available to the recipient in the market” at the time the 
contribution is made.265 Therefore, for example, if the financial 
contribution is in the form of a government loan, then it would 
constitute a subsidy only if it has been granted on terms more 
favourable than those of a comparable commercial loan in the 
market at the time the loan is provided.266 This timing requirement 
means that “the determination of benefit . . . is an ex ante analysis 
 
259  ASCM, supra note 17, art. 1.1(b). 
260  See, e.g., US — Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 83, ¶ 77.  
261  Appellate Body Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian 
Aircraft, ¶¶ 155, 158, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug. 20, 1999) [hereinafter 
Canada — Aircraft].  
262  Id. ¶¶ 154–56.  
263  See Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member 
States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶¶ 980–81, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS316/AB/R (adopted June 1, 2011) [hereinafter EC — Aircraft]. 
264  See Canada — Aircraft, supra note 261, ¶ 157.  
265  Id. EC — Aircraft, supra note 263, ¶ 706; US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra 
note 82, ¶ 636.  
266  See EC — Aircraft, supra note 263, ¶¶ 834–35. 
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that does not depend on how the particular financial contribution 
actually performed after it was granted.” 267  The benchmark 
analysis requires consideration of all relevant evidence including, 
inter alia, “the terms that would result from unconstrained 
exchange in the relevant market” and/or the commercial 
rationality of the financial contribution concerned, that is, whether 
the contribution is made based on commercial considerations.268 
One of the most controversial issues in the 
benefit/benchmark analysis concerns the determination of an 
appropriate benchmark, especially when a market is dominated or 
heavily influenced by governments.269 In US – Softwood Lumber 
IV, the US authority found that Canadian stumpage fees did not 
reflect competitive market prices and hence used external 
benchmarks to determine the magnitude of benefit under Article 
14(d), which sets forth the guideline for assessing whether 
government provision/purchase of goods is made “less/more than 
adequate remuneration.”270 The Appellate Body ruled that while 
the private prices in arm’s length transactions in the market of 
provision provide the primary benchmark, such prices may be 
replaced by an alternative benchmark if they are distorted because 
the government plays a predominant role in providing those 
goods. 271  In such circumstances, private suppliers would be 
induced to align their prices to the government price.272 However, 
government predominance in the market does not necessarily 
mean all prices are distorted; hence, whether that predominance 
has induced price alignment must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis. 273  The Appellate Body observed that alternative 
benchmarks may include the prices of similar goods in world 
markets (i.e., out-of-country benchmark) or proxies constructed 
 
267  Id. ¶ 706. 
268  See Japan — DRAMs (Korea), supra note 90, ¶ 172.  
269  See generally Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: 
The Case of Countervailing Duty Law, 19 MINN. J. INT. L. 350 (2010); Julia Qin, Market 
Benchmarks and Government Monopoly: The Case of Land and Natural Resources under 
Global Subsidies Regulation, 40(3) U. PA. J. INT’L L. 575 (2019). For a more general 
critique of the benchmark analysis, see Andrew Lang, Governing ‘As If’: Global Subsidies 
Regulation and the Benchmark Problem, 67(1) CURR. LEG. PROBL. 135 (2014). 
270  See US — Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 83, ¶ 77. 
271  Id. ¶ 90. 
272  Id. ¶ 100. 
273  Id. ¶ 102. 
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on the basis of production costs (i.e., constructed benchmark).274 
Where an alternative benchmark is employed, adjustments must 
be made to ensure the benchmark reflects the prevailing market 
conditions in the country of provision/purchase.275 These rulings, 
which have been applied and further developed in subsequent 
cases discussed below, suggest that the benefit/benchmark test 
involves two major steps: (1) determining an appropriate 
benchmark, and if an external benchmark is employed, 276  (2) 
making adjustments to that benchmark to ensure it reflects the 
prevailing conditions in the market of the subsidizing Member. 
These two steps may pose challenges for the establishment of 
“benefit conferred.”  
The first step requires evidence to show that the primary 
benchmark, such as prices of final goods or inputs or commercial 
loan rates in the market of the subsidizing Member, is distorted 
and hence needs to be replaced with an external benchmark. This 
evidentiary requirement concerns whether the role of 
governments in the market is so significant as to render the 
primary benchmark distortive and unreliable. While governments 
do play such a significant role in some markets, their role is less 
significant in other markets. For example, in US – Anti-dumping 
and Countervailing Duties (China), the WTO tribunal considered 
whether the provision of hot-rolled steel (HRS) inputs to certain 
Chinese HRS producers via SOEs conferred a benefit.277 For the 
tribunal, the fact that the Chinese government accounted for 96.1% 
of HRS production in China was sufficient to justify the use of 
alternative benchmarks.278 The tribunal also found that the interest 
rates for commercial loans in China were distorted based on the 
totality of the following evidence: (1) the government’s influence 
in the banking sector and on interest rates; (2) lending rates were 
largely undifferentiated and close to the government-set 
benchmark rate for most loans; (3) both domestic and foreign 
 
274  Id. ¶ 106. 
275  Id. ¶ 108. 
276  Note that a constructed benchmark may involve the use of out-of-country cost 
information if the in-country production cost is found to be distorted due to government 
intervention in the relevant upstream market. 
277  See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143, 
§ VI. 
278  Id. ¶¶ 454–58.  
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banks were subject to the same government controls; and (4) the 
dominant role of State-owned banks in lending activities while 
privately-owned banks only accounted for a very small percentage 
of total lending.279 In making these findings, the Appellate Body 
emphasized that it is price distortion that would allow the use of 
alternative benchmarks, not the role of the government per se.280 
It also clarified that the evidence required to prove such distortion 
may vary depending on the degree of government intervention and 
such intervention “does not refer exclusively to market shares, but 
may also refer to market power.”281 
These rulings suggest that in sectors in which private 
actors are more significant than State actors, more compelling 
evidence on market distortion would be needed. This would be the 
case in China’s high-tech sectors, such as semiconductors, NEVs, 
5G, big data, AI, etc. in which private firms have been increasing 
both market shares and market power through myriads of 
investments.282 This market situation, compared with the situation 
in the industries dominated by State actors, such as steel, energy, 
and resources, would entail a higher burden in substantiating that 
the provision of goods or services or equity infusion by the private 
entities is based on distorted terms and conditions due to 
government influence. The potential difficulties in proving in-
country price distortion may only increase if one considers the 
general position of the Appellate Body that the circumstances that 
 
279  Id. ¶¶ 503, 508.  
280  Id. ¶ 446.  
281  Id. ¶¶ 443–44.  
282  Guanyu Fabu “2019 Nian Zhongguo Bandaoti Shi Da (Qiang) Qiye Mingdan” 
De Gonggao (关于发布 “2019 年中国半导体十大（强）企业名单 ”的公告 ) 
[Announcement on Public Release “The Ten Most Competitive Chinese Companies in the 
Semi-conductor Industry in 2019’], CSIA.NET (Aug. 27, 2020), 
http://www.csia.net.cn/Article/ShowInfo.asp?InfoID=95565. (showing that private 
companies have made up a significant portion in the sector, including design of integrated 
circuit, semi-conductor manufacturing, semi-conductor testing and packaging, and semi-
conductor materials); see also China’s Top 10 Selling New Energy Cars, CHINA DAILY 
(Oct. 12, 2018), www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201810/12/WS5bbfd4c5a310eff303281e78_4.
html. (showing that in the NEV sector, private companies such as BYD and Geely are 
becoming the leaders in the market.); The Release of the Top 50 Chinese Big Data 
Companies in 2020: Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent are Listed, EAST MONEY (Aug. 28, 
2020), http://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202008281612258271.html. (showing that eight of 
the top ten big data companies in China are privately-owned); Global Artificial Intelligence 
Industry Whitepaper, DELOITTE (2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/cn/en/pages/technolo
gy-media-and-telecommunications/articles/global-ai-development-white-paper.html. 
(showing that most of China’s high-growth AI firms are privately-owned). 
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would permit the replacement of in-country private prices are 
“very limited” under the ASCM,283 and consequently, there were 
cases in which the use of an external benchmark was difficult to 
justify even when a government held a monopolistic position in 
the relevant market.284 
The second step requires adjustments be made to a 
selected external benchmark to reflect the prevailing market 
conditions in the subsidizing Member. This requirement is 
explicitly set out in Article 14(d) which contemplates certain 
factors for adjustments including price, quality, availability, 
marketability, transportation, and other conditions of purchase or 
sale of goods or services in the country of provision or purchase.285 
Such adjustments are also required under the other sub-paragraphs 
of Article 14. For example, in US – Anti-dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China), the Appellate Body held that for 
the purpose of Article 14(b) a benchmark may be employed if 
“loans in a given market and in a given currency are distorted by 
government intervention”; however, such a benchmark must be 
adjusted to approximate “a comparable commercial loan which 
the firm could actually obtain on the market”, taking into account 
factors “such as date of origination, size, maturity, currency, 
structure, or borrower’s credit risk.”286 The difficulties in making 
these adjustments relate to how to ensure they reflect the 
prevailing conditions of a market already so distorted by 
government intervention as to render the terms and conditions of 
private transactions in that market unreliable. In other words, if 
the use of an out-of-country benchmark is intended to remove the 
in-country market distortions, then making an adjustment to 
reflect the in-country market conditions may reintroduce such 
distortions into the benchmark, at least to some extent. In this 
regard, the Appellate Body explained that “prevailing market 
conditions” refer to the terms and conditions determined by 
 
283  See. e.g., US — Countervailing Measures (Article 21.5 – China), supra note 
213, ¶ 5.137. 
284  See Qin, supra note 269, at 587–606 (discussing the findings in US — Softwood 
Lumber IV, US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), and US — Carbon 
Steel (India)). 
285  ASCM, supra note 17, art. 14(d).  
286  See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143, 
¶¶ 484–86. 
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market forces, which may include commercial activities of both 
private and government-related entities.287 This confirms that the 
adjustments would need to distinguish between market-based 
terms and conditions and those distorted by government 
intervention or even to establish a counterfactual market in the 
absence of such distortions. To make it even worse, the Appellate 
Body opined, in US – Softwood Lumber IV, that the adjustments 
must reflect and maintain the comparative advantage of the 
subsidizing Member so that countervailing measures are not 
imposed to “offset differences in comparative advantages between 
countries.”288 While this is an enlightening remark, it tends to 
make the legal requirements on the adjustments of benchmarks 
even more obscure and difficult to apply and may drag WTO 
Members into endless debate about what constitutes a 
comparative advantage, to what extent such an advantage may be 
created by governments, etc.289 
These challenges associated with the application of the 
benefit/benchmark test are, again, not specific to China but have 
arisen in disputes between other WTO Members, as demonstrated 
above. As far as China is concerned, these challenges may be 
addressed through China’s WTO-plus commitment under Section 
15(b) of the Accession Protocol. That provision states:  
In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the 
SCM Agreement, when addressing subsidies 
described in Articles 14(a), 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d), 
relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement shall 
apply; however, if there are special difficulties in 
that application, the importing WTO Member 
may then use methodologies for identifying and 
measuring the subsidy benefit which take into 
account the possibility that prevailing terms and 
conditions in China may not always be available 
as appropriate benchmarks. In applying such 
methodologies, where practicable, the importing 
WTO Member should adjust such prevailing 
terms and conditions before considering the use 
 
287  See US — Carbon Steel (India), supra note 93, ¶¶ 4.150–51. 
288  See US — Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 83, ¶ 109. 
289  See Qin, supra note 269, at 613–15.  
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of terms and conditions prevailing outside 
China.290 
Although this provision has never been applied before, it arguably 
has the potential to considerably soften the legal requirements for 
the benchmark analysis, precisely in the two major steps. 
In the first step, it provides the flexibility for investigating 
authorities to employ an external benchmark if they find it 
difficult to decide the magnitude of benefits by reference to the 
terms and conditions in the Chinese market. The scope of “special 
difficulties” is not circumscribed in any way, thereby leaving wide 
latitude for authorities to decide that such difficulties exist.291 For 
example, one may argue that given the massive government 
investment fund in a particular high-tech sector, it would be 
difficult to ascertain whether equity infusion by private entities is 
based on terms and conditions unaffected by the activities of 
governments. In any event, the evidentiary requirements under the 
test of “special difficulties” would be much less onerous than 
those under Article 14 of the ASCM. 
In the second step, the obligation to adjust a selected 
benchmark is reduced to a non-obligatory best-endeavours 
requirement which merely encourages authorities to do so “where 
practicable.” Like in the first step, no matter how the term 
“practicable” is interpreted, it would be less onerous leaving room 
for investigators to exercise discretion. Applying the example 
above, if a “special difficulty” exists due to the involvement of the 
government investment fund in a high-tech sector, the same 
difficulty may be used to show that adjustments are not 
“practicable” as it is practically difficult to identify undistorted 
terms and conditions. Even in cases where China adduces 
sufficient evidence to show that such adjustments are practically 
doable, one would have to decide whether the best-endeavours 
language should otherwise be mandatory. Overall, it is argued that 
Section 15(b) of the Accession Protocol significantly relaxes the 
high standards developed by WTO tribunals in determining 
“benefits conferred”, thereby providing more flexibility for WTO 
 
290  Accession Protocol, supra note 77, § 15(b) (emphasis added). 
291  See Zhou et al., supra note 186, at 1015. 
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A subsidy that is not “prohibited” is not actionable or 
countervailable unless it is “specific” within the meaning of 
Article 2.292 This specificity requirement is intended to exclude 
subsidies that are “broadly available and widely used throughout 
an economy” from the ASCM. 293  The provision is essentially 
concerned whether a subsidy is made available only to “certain 
enterprises” or “geographical regions” in law or in fact, with a 
focus on “limitations on eligibility.”294 Thus, a subsidy is de jure 
specific if the access to or eligibility for it is explicitly limited to 
certain enterprises.295 In contrast, if the eligibility is automatic 
based on objective criteria or conditions, then the subsidy is 
ostensibly non-specific.296 However, an ostensibly non-specific 
subsidy may be found to be, in fact, specific in a particular case.297 
De jure specificity would usually rely on a written instrument 
whereas unwritten subsidies would typically trigger an inquiry 
into de facto specificity.298 To establish de facto specificity, one 
would need to demonstrate “a systematic series of actions 
pursuant to which financial contributions that confer a benefit 
have been provided to certain enterprises.”299 All evidence/factors 
relating to “specificity” and “non-specificity” must be 
considered.300  
 
292  ASCM, supra note 17, art. 2.3 (deeming export subsidies and local content 
subsidies “specific”). 
293  Panel Report, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS267/R (adopted Mar. 21, 2005), ¶ 7.1143.  
294  See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143, 
¶ 368.  
295  ASCM, supra note 17, art. 2.1(a).  
296  Id. art. 2.1(b). 
297  Id. ¶ 367. 
298  Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on 
Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 2015), 
¶ 4.129 [hereinafter US — Countervailing Measures (China)]. 
299  Id. ¶ 4.141. 
300  See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143, 
¶¶ 370–71.  
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“Certain enterprises” include “an enterprise or industry or 
group of enterprises or industries.”301 While an enterprise refers to 
a firm or business, an industry generally “relates to producers of 
certain products.”302 A subsidy is specific if eligible beneficiaries 
are limited to “certain enterprises,” regardless of whether similar 
subsidies are also granted to certain other enterprises.303 In US – 
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), for example, 
the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that the provision 
of State loans by the Chinese government to the off-the-road 
(OTR) tires industry was specific based on the following evidence: 
(1) the Eleventh Five-Year Plan which set forth an overarching 
initiative to support the auto parts industry; (2) the foreign 
investment regime which categorized certain relevant projects in 
the industry as “encouraged”, thereby directing government 
support for those projects; and (3) corresponding planning 
documents at local levels which explicitly mandated the grant of 
policy loans to such projects.304 This finding of specificity was not 
affected by the fact that these planning documents and the 
“encouraged” category also encompassed other selected industries 
or projects to which policy loans and other types of subsidies were 
granted by central and local governments.305  
Therefore, it would not be difficult to establish that many 
of China’s high-tech subsidies discussed above are de jure specific. 
The relevant national policy documents, such as the Five-Year 
plans, MIC 2025, and their implementing regulatory instruments 
at both national and local levels, explicitly set out the priority 
sectors and projects and the development goals and direct the 
provision of a variety of financial contributions to these sectors. 
For instance, these policies have led to the creation and continuous 
expansion of the government investment funds to which only 
enterprises in the selected sectors are eligible. Likewise, the 
preferential tax treatment for HNTEs and for R&D activities in 
general, as discussed in Section III.A(2) above, is also specific. 
 
301  ASCM, supra note 17, art. 2.1. 
302  See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143, 
¶ 373. 
303  See EC — Aircraft, supra note 263, ¶ 949. 
304  See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143, 
¶¶ 386–400.  
305  Id. 
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While eligibility for the preferential treatment is assessed based 
on certain criteria and conditions, one of the criteria explicitly 
requires an applicant to undertake R&D in one of the priority high-
tech sectors. Where such preferential treatment is applied at local 
levels, it may be regionally specific.  
Regional specificity concerns the eligibility for a subsidy 
being limited to “certain enterprises” in a designated geographical 
region. This type of specificity merely requires that a subsidy be 
limited to a designated region without the need to establish further 
that it is also limited to a subset of enterprises within the region.306 
Thus, a national subsidy provided to a region is specific even 
though it is made available to all enterprises in the region. In 
contrast, a subsidy granted by a local government to enterprises 
throughout its jurisdiction—i.e., not limited to a specific segment 
of the local jurisdiction—would not be regionally specific. 307 
Thus, to the extent that China’s high-tech subsidies are provided 
by a local government to enterprises in the selected sectors in its 
entire jurisdiction, such subsidies would be enterprise/industry-
specific, not regionally specific. 
Complexities may arise where the designated area is a 
segment of a local jurisdiction. In US – Anti-dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China), the panel considered the provision 
of land-use rights to certain enterprises in an Industrial Park within 
the jurisdiction of a local government in China (the Huantai 
County).308 It ruled that a designated geographical region may 
encompass “any identified tract of land within the jurisdiction of 
a granting authority” and hence the Industrial Park.309 However, 
the panel observed that the subsidy is not specific just because the 
land was physically located in the designated area. Further 
evidence was required to show that the land-use rights in the area 
constituted a “distinct regime” for the provision of that financial 
contribution compared with the general provision of land-use 
 
306  See EC — Aircraft, supra note 89, ¶ 7.1223; Panel Report, United States — 
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS379/R (adopted Mar. 25, 2011), ¶ 9.135 [hereinafter US — Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)]. 
307  See US — Countervailing Measures (China), supra note 298, ¶ 4.165. 
308  See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 306, 
¶ 9.140. 
309  Id. ¶¶ 9.140–9.144, 9.156. 
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rights by the local government in its jurisdiction. In this regard, 
the panel suggested that the subsidy may not be regionally specific 
if “all purchasers of land-use rights throughout the jurisdiction of 
the granting authority paid exactly the same below-market price 
for land.”310 As shown in Section III.A(3), industrial parks, high-
tech zones, and the like are widespread in local jurisdictions in 
China. According to the case law discussed above, the fact that 
these zones constitute designated areas and that subsidies are 
provided to these areas is insufficient to prove regional specificity. 
A further step must be taken to show that a subsidy program 
provided to such a segment of a jurisdiction is distinct. In practical 
terms, this program would be distinct if it is only available to the 
designated area or offers preferential terms and conditions 
compared to those provided to enterprises outside the area. This 
further step would not be a hurdle to establishing that China’s 
high-tech subsidies are regionally specific. For example, the 
provision of land-use rights and energy inputs to designated areas 
by local governments is typically based on preferential rates 
compared to the standard rates applicable in the relevant 
jurisdictions. This has to do with the fact that these areas are 
created to fulfill the policy objectives and mandates envisaged by 
the central government and more specifically to promote the 
growth of the priority sectors within the jurisdictions according to 
local strengths and advantages. Thus, these subsidies constitute a 
distinct regime and are regionally specific. 
Where there is no written instrument, difficulties may 
arise in establishing de facto specificity. The case law requires the 
demonstration of “a systematic series of actions” pointing to “the 
existence of an unwritten ‘subsidy programme.’”311 Recall that the 
US – Countervailing Measures (China) dispute involved the 
provision of production inputs such as HRS by Chinese SOEs to 
downstream industries for less than adequate remuneration. Due 
to the lack of any written instrument creating such a subsidy 
program, the US authority found these alleged subsidies to be de 
facto specific in a range of countervailing investigations.312 While 
 
310  Id. ¶¶ 9.158-9.160. 
311  See US — Countervailing Measures (China), supra note 298, ¶ 4.141; 
US — Countervailing Measures (Article 21.5 – China), supra note 213, ¶ 5.233. 
312  See US — Countervailing Measures (China), supra note 298, ¶ 4.148. 
JUNE 2021 SUBSIDIZING TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION 531 
these findings were endorsed by the panel in the original 
proceedings, the Appellate Body rejected the panel’s ruling that 
the consistent provision of the relevant input by the SOEs was 
sufficient to show the existence of “a systematic series of 
actions.”313 However, the Appellate Body was unable to complete 
the analysis for lack of factual findings, leaving the issue of de 
facto specificity unresolved.314 In the compliance proceedings, the 
Appellate Body, in upholding the findings of the compliance panel, 
elaborated that de facto specificity cannot be established merely 
based on “repeated transactions” but requires an assessment of 
how such transactions have constituted “a systematic subsidy 
programme.” 315  In its findings of de facto specificity, the US 
authority merely requested information on the industry providing 
the relevant input and the number of recipients for three and four 
years respectively, without explaining how such information 
substantiated the existence of an unwritten subsidy programme.316 
Only during the compliance proceedings had the US adduced 
additional evidence relating to various Chinese policy mandates 
leading to the provision of the relevant input for nearly 50 years. 
Both the compliance panel and the Appellate Body regarded the 
additional evidence as “an ex post rationale” and refused to accept 
it. 317 In any event, the Appellate Body stressed that the existence 
of such policy mandates, in itself, would not suffice and “a 
reasoned and adequate explanation” must be provided to show the 
existence of “a systematic subsidy programme.”318  
Thus, compared with de jure specificity, the showing of 
de facto specificity requires a higher evidentiary standard and 
level of analysis. This in turn makes it more difficult for 
investigating authorities to tackle hidden or unwritten subsidies 
through countervailing measures. Although this difficulty applies 
to all WTO Members, China’s longstanding practice of using 
SOEs to supply input at low costs to selected sectors has 
 
313  Id. ¶¶ 4.148–4.151. 
314  Id. ¶¶ 4.152-4.157. 
315  See US — Countervailing Measures (Article 21.5 – China), supra note 213, 
¶¶ 5.231–5.233.  
316  Id. ¶ 5.237. 
317  Id. ¶¶ 5.240–5.241. 
318  Id. ¶¶ 5.219, 5.240. 
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understandably generated considerable concerns.319 However, one 
may argue that at the end of US – Countervailing Measures 
(China), the Appellate Body was no longer concerned about the 
sufficiency of evidence after the US had provided the additional 
information in the compliance proceedings. Such information was 
not accepted by the WTO tribunals simply because it did not form 
the basis of US findings of de facto specificity in its countervailing 
investigations. In contrast, the remaining concern of the Appellate 
Body seems to be the lack of “a reasoned and adequate 
explanation” that links the various policy documents to the 
existence of an unwritten subsidy program.320 Admittedly, more 
guidance is needed to fully understand the degree of explanation 
required. As far as China’s high-tech sector is concerned, it would 
not be unreasonably difficult to offer such an explanation. The 
relevant evidence would include the existence of numerous policy 
documents that explicitly direct all governments to support the 
selected high-tech sectors, the dominant role of SOEs in the 
critical upstream industries, and the wide-ranging subsidies 
granted to these SOEs to enable them to supply lower-priced input 
for production. 321  In reality, authorities may well utilize the 
ambiguities and hence flexibilities left by the US – Countervailing 
Measures (China) decision to treat the provision of production 
input by Chinese SOEs for less than adequate remuneration as 
being specific. Such practice has been widely adopted in 
 
319  For instance, Chinese SOEs have provided stable supply of alumina, a key input 
to electronics products, at below-market or even below-cost prices to local companies. See 
OECD Aluminum Report, supra note 172, at 93. Chinese steel SOEs also have received 
government subsidies over the years, which have enabled them to supply low-priced steel 
products to downstream industries, such as high-end equipment manufacturing. See Yibo 
Zhao (赵毅波), Zhaoyibo Ju Kui Bao Gang Niannei Huo 17 Yi Zhengfu Buzhu Fenxi Cheng 
Duanqi Nei Zishen Niukui Wuwang (巨亏包钢年内获 17亿政府补助 分析称短期内自
身扭亏无望) [Profits-Losing BaoSteel Received RMB 1.7 Billion Government Subsidies 
and Analysis Points Out the Lack of Chance in Stop Losing on Its Own], SINA FINANCE 
(Dec. 30, 2015), http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/2015-12-30/doc-
ifxmxxst0778361.shtml. 
320  See US — Countervailing Measures (Article 21.5 – China), supra note 213, 
¶ 5.241. 
321  See, e.g., OECD Aluminum Report, supra note 172; MORRISON & TANG, supra 
note 172, at 13–14; Julia Ya Qin, WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) — A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 7(4) J. INT. ECON. LAW 
863, 875–82 (2004). 
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numerous countervailing investigations against China. 322  More 
often than not, authorities have also resorted to concurrent anti-
dumping actions to address the market distortion and adverse 
impact caused by Chinese subsidies on domestic industries.323  
In addition, one may argue that the source of the 
distortions lies in the subsidies and preferential treatment provided 
to SOEs which enables them to supply production input for less 
than adequate remuneration. Therefore, one way to deal with the 
subsidies to downstream industries would be to address the source 
of the problem, that is, to push China to reduce or remove the 
subsidies to SOEs. In this regard, Section 10.2 of China’s 
Accession Protocol allows WTO Members to deem Chinese 
subsidies to SOEs as being “specific” if the SOEs “are the 
predominant recipients of such subsidies or . . . receive 
disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies.” Given the 
dominant role of SOEs in the upstream industries mentioned 
above and the large amount of subsidies they receive, this WTO-
plus commitment would mean that any subsidies provided to 
SOEs in these sectors would be “specific.”324 More broadly, as 
discussed in Section III.A(3), paragraph 46 of the Working Party 
Report requires Chinese SOEs and SIEs to make purchases and 
sales solely based on commercial considerations. It may be argued 
that the longstanding and consistent practice of Chinese SOEs and 
SIEs selling input to selected downstream industries for less than 
adequate remuneration precluded them from making reasonable 
returns that would generally be expected in commercial 
transactions. This obligation, therefore, provides an extra tool to 
address the problem concerned without the need to resort to the 
ASCM and thereby avoids the potential difficulties in establishing 
de facto specificity. 
F. Concluding Remarks 
In summary, the ASCM does not cover all kinds of 
government actions, especially those which may be regarded as 
indirect subsidization. However, the scope of “financial 
 
322  See generally NON-MARKET ECONOMIES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM: 
THE SPECIAL CASE OF CHINA, supra note 233. 
323  Id. 
324  See Qin, supra note 321, at 890–91. 
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contributions” is apparently broad enough to capture the major 
subsidies in China’s high-tech sector. Government measures, such 
as export restraints, VAT rebates, regulatory preferences or 
incentives, that seem to fall outside the reach of the ASCM are 
used widely in the high-tech and other industries across many 
jurisdictions and may cause market distortions detrimental to 
trading partners.325 Other existing WTO rules, including China’s 
WTO-plus obligations, should be employed to tackle these 
measures and distortions more directly. Likewise, contrary to the 
dominant view that the existing WTO rules are inadequate to 
tackle Chinese subsidies, the other major legal conditions (i.e., 
public body, entrusted or directed private body, benefits conferred 
and specificity) which must be satisfied for a financial 
contribution to be actionable or countervailable are not so difficult 
to establish either. Where difficulties may arise when trying to 
establish these conditions, they generally apply to all WTO 
Members. 326  If anything, China’s WTO-plus obligations have 
provided important additional discipline on Chinese subsidies, 
and market-distortive behaviour and conduct more broadly, 
leaving significantly less policy space for China. Since these extra 
rules have been strikingly under-utilized to date, the claim that the 
current rules are inadequate is unpersuasive and misleading. 
Finally, where new and better rules may be needed, they can only 
be created by WTO Members through negotiations, not by WTO 
tribunals through adjudication. 
III. FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SUBSIDY REGULATION 
As an essential policy tool, industrial subsidies were on 
the rise before the pandemic and have become even more crucial 
 
325  See generally OECD Semiconductor Report, supra note 105; OECD Aluminum 
Report, supra note 172. 
326  One may remain concerned about the high evidentiary burden that may result 
from China’s non-transparent system. However, this whole section has shown that China’s 
major high-tech subsidies are not provided in such a non-transparent manner as widely 
observed and hence are not so difficult to challenge under the ASCM and other WTO rules 
including China-specific rules. In addition, one should also note that Article 13.1 of WTO’s 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes requires a 
disputing party to provide information requested by the panel promptly and fully. See 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 13.1, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. This may permit the panel to draw an adverse inference if such 
information is not provided in the required manner. We thank Simon Lester for this insight. 
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as governments around the globe pursue economic recovery.327 
There is, therefore, a growing and imminent need for governments 
to find a way to address the detrimental effects of subsidies on 
trade and avoid tit-for-tat subsidization. There are at least three 
options. One is for each government to unilaterally reduce or 
remove the pandemic-induced subsidies as they become 
dispensable. This option, however, will unlikely affect subsidies 
less related to the pandemic such as those in high-tech industries. 
The second option would be for governments to challenge these 
subsidies at the WTO. While this option may cover all industrial 
subsidies regardless of whether they are pandemic-related, it may 
not be effective in the absence of a functioning Appellate Body as 
losing parties may simply ‘appeal into the void,’ which would 
gradually disincentivize governments from resorting to the 
dispute settlement mechanism.328 There is, therefore, an urgency 
for WTO Members to revive the Appellate Body. In the case of 
China, the dispute settlement mechanism proved effective in 
enforcing compliance and influencing domestic policymaking and 
even prompted gradual and systematic adjustments of China’s 
complex regulatory regime.329 However, if the other major players 
continue to abuse the right of appeal to avoid binding decisions 
and implementation, it will become increasingly difficult to use 
the system to push China to reduce or remove trade-distortive 
subsidies. 330  The third option is negotiation which may start 
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among major economies to lay the groundwork for more inclusive 
negotiations at the multilateral level. To do so, governments will 
need to leverage the impacts of the pandemic and the global 
(ab)use of subsidies to generate sufficient political will for change. 
Despite the difficulties in such negotiations and the time they may 
take, this is the only way to address any perceived deficiencies in 
the current subsidy rules. Thus, the rest of this section, seeks to 
develop some general principles and approaches for future 
negotiations of industrial subsidies after a brief discussion of the 
major proposals in the literature.  
Existing proposals for the reform of WTO subsidy rules 
largely reflect the competing interests between strengthening the 
current rules and preserving policy space. One major proposal 
calling for more onerous discipline is the latest US-EU-Japan joint 
statement released on 14 January 2020.331 Amongst others, the 
joint statement proposes to expand the list of prohibited subsidies, 
specify the circumstances in which external benchmarks may be 
used for the determination of “benefit conferred,” and reverse the 
Appellate Body’s “authority/function-based” approach to “public 
body.” We have discussed why the current laws on the use of 
external benchmarks and the determination of “public body” are 
not inadequate to address Chinese subsidies in the high-tech sector 
in Section III. This discussion is applicable to subsidies in other 
Chinese industries. As regards the proposed prohibited subsidies, 
the joint statement is concerned about only a few selected types of 
subsidies: unlimited guarantees, subsidies aiming to rescue an 
insolvent enterprise or to finance an enterprise in sectors or 
industries in overcapacity, and certain direct forgiveness of 
debt.332 The fundamental problem in this proposal is the lack of 
any rationale for the treatment of the selected subsidies more 
strictly than other subsidies. This problem has to do with the fact 
 
anti-dumping actions against Russia. See Notification of an Appeal by the European Union, 
European Union — Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Imports from Russia (Second Complaint), WTO Doc. WT/DS494/7 (Sept. 1, 2020). 
These abuses would undermine the effectiveness of the system and incentivize other major 
players like China to do the same to avoid unfavorable decisions. 
331  See 2020 Joint Statement, supra note 15; see also Robert Howse, Making the 
WTO (Not So) Great Again: The Case Against Responding to the Trump Trade Agenda 
Through Reform of WTO Rules on Subsidies and State Enterprises, 23(2) J. INT. ECON. 
LAW 371 (2020). 
332  Id. 
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that the joint statement targets China and hence some of the 
Chinese subsidies that have attracted considerable criticisms.333 
As such, this proposal has ignored many other equally or even 
more controversial subsidies in the economies of other WTO 
Members including the parties to the joint statement. Another 
major problem of this proposal is the lack of consideration of the 
policy space needed for governments to use the named subsidies 
for legitimate regulatory goals. Future negotiations will need to 
address subsidies in the economies of all negotiating parties in 
ways that strike a balance between further regulation of subsidies 
and protection of legitimate use of subsidies.  
In contrast, proposals of developing countries in the Doha 
round have gone in the opposite direction calling for more policy 
space by reintroducing non-actionable subsidies.334 More recently, 
China’s proposal on WTO reforms also sought to reinstate and 
expand the coverage of non-actionable subsidies as a way to curb 
the abuse of countervailing measures. 335  In line with these 
proposals, leading commentators put forward recommendations 
for developing an improved mechanism to provide sufficient room 
for the application of subsidies for environmental,336 R&D,337 and 
other legitimate goals, particularly those envisaged under the pre-
existing non-actionable scheme. 338  These proposals speak 
strongly to the importance of maintaining flexibility for the use of 
subsidies in pursuit of legitimate regulatory goals and the need to 
broaden the scope of permitted subsidies.339 
Drawing on our discussions so far, we put forward three 
general principles for future negotiations of subsidy rules. First, 
the negotiations must not be disproportionately focused on China 
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and instead must focus on addressing trade-distortive subsidies in 
all economies involved. Given the widespread use of industrial 
subsidies, a China-focus would be perceived by China as 
discriminatory treatment, thereby adding unnecessary 
complexities to the already difficult negotiations and undermining 
the chances of reaching a positive outcome.  
Second, the negotiations need to strike a balance between 
tightening the regulation of subsidies and maintaining the 
flexibility to use subsidies for legitimate policy objectives. As 
mentioned in Section III and argued in detail elsewhere, the 
Theory of Distortions and Welfare provides well-established 
economic guidance for how to achieve this balance.340 In essence, 
the theory establishes that for trade liberalization to remain 
welfare-enhancing, trade rules must allow governments the 
freedom to address their own domestic externalities or non-
protectionist policy goals. However, the theory suggests that the 
policy instruments that governments employ to achieve a chosen 
goal would need to be regulated. In this regard, the theory ranks 
different policy instruments according to their economic 
efficiency and develops the Targeting Rule whereby the efficiency 
of an instrument enhances as it tackles the chosen objective more 
closely. This general rule is subject to the by-product costs 
associated with the use of an optimal instrument. For instance, 
while direct subsidization tends to be an optimal means to address 
domestic externalities on many occasions, it may become sub-
optimal as the costs of disbursement may outweigh the efficiency 
gains generated by the use of subsidies as opposed to other 
means.341 These propositions suggest that one way to distinguish 
“good” and “bad” subsidies, from an economic perspective, would 
be to inquiry into whether a chosen subsidy targets a given 
objective directly at the source and if not, why a sub-optimal 
subsidy is adopted, taking into account the effectiveness of the 
subsidies in pursuing the objective and their by-product costs. For 
example, if the externality concerns the lack of consumption of 
certain goods or an objective to stimulate that consumption, then 
 
340  See generally Zhou, supra note 60; Weihuan Zhou & Henry Gao, US-China 
Trade War: A Way Out?, 19(4) WORLD TRADE REV. 605 (2020). 
341  See W.M. CORDEN, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 33–44 (2d ed., 
1997).  
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a subsidy to consumers would be generally more efficient than 
other types of subsidies. Where the externality concerns an 
inefficient capital market or an objective to promote finance for 
R&D, then a direct subsidization (e.g., in the form of tax 
incentives) in the capital market would be preferable. Overall, the 
significance of the theory lies in the distinction between policy 
objectives and policy instruments and the emphasis on regulating 
the latter while leaving room for consideration of the effectiveness 
and reasonable availability of less efficient means. In doing so, the 
theory also offers a way to discipline protectionist use of subsidies 
without unduly impairing the capacity of governments to use 
subsidies for legitimate goals.342 
Third, while the negotiations should generally follow the 
economic guidance above, they need to pursue an outcome that is 
politically achievable. In subsidy negotiations, as shown in 
Section III, governments may be more concerned about the 
impacts of a foreign subsidy on their domestic industries than the 
welfare effects of the subsidy. Recently, two major proposals have 
stressed the need to target subsidies with negative spillover effects 
from a global perspective.343 To do so, however, governments will 
need to be provided with sufficient data and other information to 
assess the actual or potential global welfare effects of numerous 
types of subsidies. And even if such data is made available, 
governments would be likely to remain more concerned about the 
impacts of subsidies on domestic industries as opposed to their 
global welfare effects. In addition, just like negotiations in other 
areas of trade, future subsidy negotiations will necessarily leave 
some trade-distortive subsidies un-addressed or under-addressed 
for political reasons. Taken together, the above means that reforms 
of subsidy rules will be affected by political considerations, 
although it is advisable for negotiators to follow the economic 
guidance and data and will only progress incrementally. 
Considering the principles above, we propose the 
following general approaches to future negotiations of industrial 
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subsidies. Governments should be allowed to choose their own 
policy objectives but should be asked to provide information 
about the objective(s) behind an existing or potential subsidy. In 
this regard, Article 25.3(iii) of the ASCM already requires WTO 
Members to do so in their notifications of subsidies, which could 
be used as a basis for the negotiations. The identification of policy 
objectives is necessary for a discussion about whether a subsidy is 
the optimal means to pursue a given objective and if not, whether 
it is because an optimal subsidy is not reasonably available so that 
a different type of subsidy is needed. This discussion will also 
involve consideration of the impact of a subsidy on trading 
partners, its global welfare effects, and political implications for 
both subsidizing and affected foreign countries. Through this 
approach, the outcome of negotiations would reflect a balance 
which allows room for governments to use economically 
preferable and politically feasible subsidies for any preferred 
objectives while at the same time reducing the impacts of these 
subsidies on trading partners. 
To enhance the achievability of a political compromise, it 
is necessary for the negotiations to deviate from the conventional 
approach to the regulation of industrial subsidies whereby all 
governments are subject to the same set of rules on, inter alia, 
prohibited and non-actionable subsidies and the conditions for the 
use of non-actionable subsidies including the magnitude of such 
subsidies. Instead, the negotiations must recognize that each 
country has different regulatory priorities/needs and different 
economic, political, and social situations and constraints in terms 
of the use of subsidies, the level of support, etc. especially in the 
post-pandemic era. While the conventional approach may still be 
used to set out rules that are generally applicable, it must be 
supplemented by an approach that allows country-specific 
commitments and exceptions. For this purpose, the negotiations 
should adopt a scheduling approach to produce an Industrial 
Subsidy Schedule for each country. This approach is nothing new 
to the WTO and has already been adopted in negotiations of tariff 
concessions and commitments in trade in services, although it may 
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be more complex for subsidy negotiations. 344  An Industrial 
Subsidy Schedule should set out the sectors that may require 
subsidization, the objective(s) that a subsidy serves, the magnitude 
of subsidies (which may include an upper limit and/or a phase-
down or phase-out period), and any foreseeable circumstances in 
which similar or new subsidies may need to be re-introduced or 
the magnitude may need to be increased. To give effect to the 
schedule, a provision will need to be added to the ASCM to 
require governments not to grant subsidies that go beyond their 
scheduled commitments. A provision on renegotiation of the 
commitments or modification of schedules would also be 
desirable.  
In addition, governments should have the right to use 
subsidies for legitimate policy objectives that are commonly 
accepted. This requires an additional provision in the ASCM to 
explicitly allow recourse to the general exceptions and security 
exceptions set out in GATT Articles XX and XXI. 345  This 
provision may simply reproduce Article 3 of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measure 346  which states: “All 
exceptions under GATT 1994 shall apply, as appropriate, to the 
provisions of this Agreement.” This addition is important and 
necessary as it would ensure that the exceptions are consistently 
applied to different kinds of policy instruments and would 
incentivize governments to use subsidies, as opposed to less 
efficient and more trade-restrictive means, such as quantitative 
restrictions and tariffs, for these regulatory goals.  
Finally, it is worth noting that our proposals are not 
intended to cover all aspects of future negotiations on industrial 
subsidies. For example, there is a need for discussions about how 
to measure negative cross-border spill-over effects of subsidies 
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and develop international rules on competitive neutrality,347 and 
for an improvement of subsidy notifications and transparency. 
Our purpose is to contribute to the ongoing discussions of how 
best to re-invigorate and facilitate international cooperation on the 
regulation of industrial subsidies. 
CONCLUSION 
For decades, the multilateral trading system played a 
critical role in promoting international cooperation on trade 
policymaking, dispute resolution, and made significant 
contributions to maintaining peace and prosperity for the 
international community. Amongst other factors, China’s rise has 
caused growing concerns about whether the system is effective 
and should remain relevant. These concerns led to dramatic trade 
policy changes in the United States, with the United States taking 
unilateral actions against China and strangulating multilateral 
cooperation while in the meantime calling for reforms of the WTO. 
While the outbreak of COVID-19 intensified the crisis in the 
multilateral trading system, none of these China-related concerns 
are caused by the pandemic and will not subside with it.  
China’s economic growth relied heavily on industrial 
policies and subsidies which have been increasingly applied to 
foster China’s technological capability, indigenous innovation, 
and global competitiveness. US unilateral actions have proven to 
be futile and will remain so if the purpose is to fundamentally 
change China’s economic model or curb its technological 
advancement.348 Like all other countries, China should and has 
every right to upgrade its economic growth model and promote 
innovation and digital transformation. Whether China has done so 
in ways that violate its international obligations must be assessed 
by WTO tribunals based on evidence and detailed legal 
examination rather than by unsubstantiated allegations. Likewise, 
whether new rules may be needed to deal with China requires a 
careful assessment of the existing rules and jurisprudence, and 
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eventually must be determined by all WTO Members via 
negotiations. Both the negotiation of new rules and the 
adjudication of trade disputes require a functional system for 
international cooperation which China has consistently advocated 
for.349 Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that only through 
the multilateral approach, rather than unilateral actions, may one 
effectively address so-called ‘China issues,’ including industrial 
policies and subsidies. Fortunately, there seem to be some positive 
signs of moves in this direction under the Biden Administration.350 
Although China’s industrial policies and subsidies have 
been at the core of the US’s concerns and global trade policy 
debate, such policies are widely used by all economies for a 
variety of domestic regulatory goals. Both the application of the 
current WTO rules on subsidies and the development of new rules 
in the future must strike a balance between regulating trade-
distortive subsidies and protecting policy space for the legitimate 
use of subsidies. In this regard, one must note that China’s WTO 
obligations have extended significantly beyond the general WTO 
rules and have the potential to constrain Chinese industrial 
subsidies and government intervention in the economy more 
broadly. The efficacy of most of these China-specific rules has 
remained untested to date. Yet, the view that the current rules are 
inadequate to tackle Chinese subsidies has (unjustifiably) 
dominated the international trade community. 
Using China’s subsidization in the high-tech sector as an 
illustration, we have challenged this dominant view by showing 
that even the general WTO rules on subsidies do not create any 
substantive hurdles to tackling the major types of Chinese 
technology subsidies. Where difficulties may arise in a few 
circumstances, these are not specific to China but generally apply 
to all WTO Members. In addition, the China-specific rules are 
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drafted in a broad manner so as to provide not only flexibilities to 
overcome these difficulties but also extra tools to constrain other 
modes of state intervention that may adversely affect the interests 
of China’s trading partners. Given China’s good record of 
compliance with WTO rulings, one should be optimistic about 
using the dispute settlement system to push China to reduce or 
remove subsidies and other WTO-illegal laws and practices. This, 
however, will be difficult to achieve in the absence of a functional 
Appellate Body. 351  Although we have focused on technology 
subsidies in this paper, our discussions and observations may be 
applied to other industrial policies and subsidies in China. 
Faced with the widespread and increasing use of 
industrial subsidies triggered by the pandemic, policymakers, 
scholars, and other stakeholders have been developing 
mechanisms for international cooperation. To contribute to this 
discussion, we put forward some general principles and 
approaches for future negotiations of industrial subsidies 
emphasizing the need to target trade-distortive subsidies rather 
than China, to balance between strengthening subsidy rules and 
preserving policy space, to follow economic guidance and data 
while accommodating political considerations, and most 
innovatively, to shift from the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to a 
country-specific approach through a scheduling method whereby 
an Industrial Subsidy Schedule is created to record policy 
objectives, commitments, and exceptions of each nation. Our 
recommendations are not intended to be exhaustive, but to 
develop ideas that may facilitate international cooperation on 
industrial subsidies. 
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